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INTRODUCTION

Now you see it. Now you don't.
This is not a magician's incantation. It is a description of retroactive
classification, a little-known provision of U.S. national security law that
allows the government to declassify a document, release it to the public, and
then declare it classified later on. Retroactive classification means the
government could hand you a document today and prosecute you tomorrow
for not giving it back. Retroactive classification can even reach documents
that are available in public libraries, on the Internet, or elsewhere in the
public domain.
The executive branch has used retroactive classification to startling
effect. The Department of Justice, for example, declassified and released a
report on National Security Agency (NSA) wiretapping only to declare,
years later, that the report was once again classified. The journalist who had
received the report was threatened with prosecution if he did not return it.
Retroactive classification has also targeted government documents revealing
corruption in Iraq, violence in Afghanistan, and mismanagement of the
national missile defense program. In each of these cases, the government
released a document in an unclassified form through official channels-not
through a leak-and then turned around to classify it.
This practice would be troubling enough if it actually removed the
document from the public domain. But in the Internet Age, once a
document is released to the public, it is often impossible for the government
to retrieve it. While retroactive classification does not remove the document
from the public domain, where our enemies can access it, retroactive
classification does remove the document from the public discourse,
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prohibiting members of Congress, government auditors, and law-abiding
members of the public from openly discussing it.
In the ongoing debate about the balance between secrecy and
transparency in government affairs, retroactive classification tests the limits
of the government's ability to control information in the public domain.
The questions raised by retroactive classification go far beyond those raised
by the WikiLeaks and Edward Snowden disclosures. In those cases, the
information remained classified even though it was widely available in the
public domain. A similar situation occurs with retroactive classification
when information in the public domain becomes classified. The difference is
that in retroactive classification, the government initially released this
information in a non-classified form and only later decided to classify it.
This difference makes retroactive classification much more complicated
from a legal standpoint because it involves the government's going back on
its initial classification decision. Retroactive classification thus forces us to
ask what limits, if any, exist on the government's authority to control
information. Can the government reach into the public domain to make a
secret out of something it has already disclosed? Are we obligated to go
along with retroactive classification decisions? What are the implications
beyond national security law? This Article takes up these pressing questions.

Retroactive classification is a doctrine rife with contradictions. Just ask
the former director of the Information Security Oversight Office, the
federal agency charged with overseeing the classification system. He called
it "a metaphysical impossibility" to classify information "whose disclosure
was authorized in the first place."1 Members of Congress have been
unstinting in their criticism, disparaging retroactive classification as "an insult
to the American people, to the public, to this institution of Congress,"2 "an
attempt to stymie public debate,' 3 and an "absurd effort to put the toothpaste
1 Jim White, Desite Metaphysical Impossibility, US. Government Repeatedly Attempts Retroactive

Classification, EMPTYWHEEL

(Jan.

23,

2012),

http://www.emptywheel.net/2o12/o123/despite-

metaphysical-impossibility-us-govemment-repeatedy-attempts-retroactive-classification,
archived at
http://perma.cc/
N292-VXPR.
2 Too Many Secrets: Overclassificationas a Barrierto CriticalInformation Sharing: HearingBefore
the Subcomm. on Nat'l Sec., Emerging Threats and Int'l Relations of the H. Comm. on Gov't Reform,
io8th Cong. 84 (2004) [hereinafter Too Many Secrets Hearing] (statement of Rep. John Tierney).
3 Letter from Rep. Henry Waxman & Rep. John Tierney to Donald Rumsfeld, Sec'y of Def.
(Mar. 25, 2004) [hereinafter Waxman & Tierney letter], available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/
congress/2oo4/ho325o4.pdf
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back into the tube."'4 The Washington Post editorial board thought retroactive
classification "would be funny if it weren't so emblematic of a disturbing
new culture of government secrecy.''5 James Bamford, a journalist who
experienced it firsthand, warned of "total anarchy for historians and
scholars ... if one administration would be permitted to recall history by
forcing these people to return materials released by a previous
administration." 6 Even university archivists, generally an even-tempered lot,
have expressed outrage, excoriating the retroactive classification of 25,000
documents at the National Archives as "a breathtaking assault on the
fundamental principles under which we try to operate."7
Despite the criticism, however, retroactive classification remains the law,
and an altogether unexplored one, at that. Legal scholarship has provided
only glancing treatment. A few authors mention it in passing to point out
abuses in the larger classification system,8 or to draw analogies to Freedom
of Information Act and state secrets case law.9 Two student notes have taken

4 Drowning in a Sea of Faux Secrets: Policies on Handling of Classified and Sensitive Information:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nat'l Sec., Emerging Threats, and Int'l Relations of the H. Comm. on
Gov't Reform, lo9th Cong. 2, 6 (2oo6) [hereinafter Drowning in a Sea of Faux Secrets Hearing]
(statement of Rep. Christopher Shays).
5 Editorial, Classifying Toothpaste, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2006, at A14.
6 1984: Civil Liberties and the National Security State: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 9 8th Cong. 38 (1983)
[hereinafter 1984: Civil Liberties Hearings] (statement of James Bamford).
7 H.R. i2S5, The PresidentialRecords Act of 1978: A Review of Executive Branch Implementation
and Compliance, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Info. Policy, Census, and Nat'l Archives of the H.
Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, sioth Cong. 1o6 (2007) (statement of Steven L. Hensen, Dir.
of Technical Ser., Rare Book, Manuscript, and Special Collections Library, Duke Univ.).
8 E.g., Jane E. Kirtley, Transparency and Accountability in A Time of Terror: The Bush
Administration'sAssault on Freedom of Information, is COMM. L. & POL'Y 479, 502-05 (2006); see also
Anthony R. Klein, Comment, National Security Information: Its Proper Role and Scope in a
Representative Democracy, 42 FED. COMM. L.J. 433, 437 n.23 (1989) (discussing the use of
reclassification powers by the Reagan administration); Derigan A. Silver, National Security and the
Press: The Government's Ability to Prosecute Journalistsfor the Possession or Publication of National
Security Information, 13 COMM. L. & POL'Y 447, 449-50 (2008) (noting the many ways in which

the George W. Bush administration increased government secrecy including through the use of
classification and reclassification).
9 E.g., Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 77, 193-94 (2010);
see also Susan Nevelow Mart, Let the People Know the Facts: Can Government Information Removed
from the Internet Be Reclaimed?, 98 LAw LIBR. J. 7, 21, 29 (2oo6) (focusing on the withholding of
documents, rather than classification); Jonathan Turley, Through a Looking Glass Darkly: National
Security and Statutory Interpretation, 53 SMU L. REV. 205, 215-16 (2000) (citing retroactive

classification in an argument about judicial deference in the context of national security); David C.
Vladeck, Litigating National Security Cases in the Aftermath of9/11, 2 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y 165,
166 (2006) (discussing the Sibel Edmonds case and classification in the context of "how far the
Administration has gone to press its national security arguments"); Anthony Rapa, Comment,
When Secrecy Threatens Security: Edmonds v. Department of Justice and A Proposal to Reform the
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positions on its constitutional legitimacy-one in favor,'0 and the other
opposed." But no systematic examination of the topic exists. No one has
looked at how retroactive classification came about, what laws constrain-or
fail to constrain-it, or how it is used in practice. Nor has anyone analyzed
the essential question of whether retroactive classification can be enforced
by criminal prosecution. 12 This Article aims to fill those gaps.
The Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I begins with several examples
of retroactive classification and then looks at the evolution of the practice by
drawing on congressional hearings, original interviews, and the text of the
executive orders that have authorized retroactive classification. Since the
late 1970s, retroactive classification has been alternately banned and
embraced by successive administrations," and the growth of the Internet
has made the notion of reclaiming documents from the public domain
increasingly absurd. This Part argues that the current law provides no
effective restraint on the practice of retroactive classification.
Part II asks whether retroactive classification can be enforced by
criminal prosecution. If the government retroactively classifies a document
in my possession, and I ignore the new classification, can I be prosecuted for
publishing it? This Part begins with the debate about whether the Espionage
Act-the most likely tool for enforcing retroactive classification-can be
applied to people outside of the government who receive classified
documents and then publish them. Part II next discusses how the Espionage
Act analysis would differ if the documents were not just classified but
retroactively classified. It shows how retroactive classification challenges basic
assumptions about what it means to leak information, who has an obligation
State Secrets Privilege, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 233, 266 (2006) (discussing use of the state secrets
privilege to retroactively classify information).
10 Luppe B. Luppen, Note, just When I Thought I Was Out, They Pull Me Back In: Executive
Power and the Novel Reclassification Authority, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1115,119,i1156 (2007).
11 Amanda Fitzsimmons, Comment, National Security or Unnecessary Secrecy? Restricting
Exemption i to Prohibit Reclassification of Information Already in the Public Domain, 4 J.L. & POL'Y
FOR INFO. SOC'Y 4 79, 484 (20o8).
12 One author dismissed the possibility of prosecution out of hand. See Vladeck, supra note 9,
at 178 ("[N]o court would have upheld the government's right to attach criminal sanctions to the
publication of widely available information."). Another concluded that, in fashioning criminal
punishments, "Congress has mostly disregarded the Executive's classification scheme." Luppen,
supra note lo, at 1131.

13 President Carter's

executive

order on

security classifications banned

retroactive

classification. Exec. Order No. 12,o65, § 1-607, 3 C.F.R. 111, 195 (1979). President Reagan's order

allowed it. Exec. Order No. 12,356, § 14(a), 3 C.F.R. 166, 169 (1983). President George H.W. Bush
used President Reagan's order. President Bill Clinton's order banned it. Exec. Order No. 12,958,
§ t.8(c), 3 C.F.R. 317, 339 (1996). President George W. Bush allowed it. Exec. Order No. 13,292,
§ 1.7(c), 3 C.F.R. 159, 200 (2004). So did President Barack Obama. Exec. Order No. 13,526,
§1.7(c), 3 C.F.R. 183, 302 (2010).
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to keep a secret, and how to define the public record. Part II concludes that
a prosecution based on retroactively classified information could go forward
despite serious Espionage Act and First Amendment problems.
Part III steps back to survey how other substantive areas of the law deal
with their own versions of retroactive classification. Retroactive classification
may be mean-spirited, unconstitutional, and even metaphysically impossible,
but it is not without precedent. There are many other contexts outside
national security where the government attempts to punish the publication
of information that it has previously disclosed in the public record,
including its attempts to protect Social Security numbers, police officers'
home addresses, tax return information, and other sensitive pieces of
information. These analogues from other areas of the law not only make
retroactive classification seem more plausible as a threat to free speech and
the freedom of the press, but also show how retroactive classification fits
into a debate that transcends national security law-a debate about the
government's ability to control information in the public record. Justice
Stewart famously wrote: "So far as the Constitution goes, the autonomous
press may publish what it knows, and may seek to learn what it can." 14 But
retroactive classification and its analogues challenge that claim.
Finally, Part IV looks at still another constitutional complication for
retroactive classification: the separation of powers. Members of Congress
claim the executive branch has used retroactive classification to gag
legislative debate and impede constitutionally required oversight. But the
Constitution's Speech or Debate Clause protects these legislators from
being prosecuted or even questioned for anything they say in debate-even
if their statements reveal classified information. Part V explores the
paradox that members of the legislative branch are both more protected
from and more vulnerable to retroactive classification than members of the
public.
The concluding note makes several practical suggestions for reform.
These suggestions include changing the executive orders that govern
retroactive classification, addressing the problem of retroactive classification
statutorily, and amending House and Senate rules to avoid a separation of
powers issue.
I. RETROACTIVE CLASSIFICATION IN PRACTICE AND THEORY
What does it mean for the government to disclose a document and later
declare it classified? This Part begins with several examples, proceeds
14

Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 636 (1975).
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through the history of retroactive classification, and concludes by showing
how, in the Internet Age, the rules designed to limit retroactive
classification can no longer do so.
A. Examples of Retroactive Classification
In 1978, journalist James Bamford sent a Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) request to the Justice Department. He wanted documents related
to the Department's investigation of illegal wiretapping performed by the
NSA. Among the surveillance programs the Justice Department investigated
was Operation MINARET, which spied on Martin Luther King, Jr., Jane
Fonda, and other opponents of the Vietnam War. 5 The chief of the Justice
Department's special litigation unit, the unit that led the investigation into
the NSA, took ten months to review the request.1 6 In the end, the Justice
17
Department declassified and released 250 pages of documents to Bamford.
When the NSA found out about the disclosure, however, it argued that the
documents should never have been released and demanded that the Justice
Department label them as classified. 18 The Justice Department refused.19
Two years later, with a new administration in the White House and new
leaders atop the two agencies, the NSA tried again. This time, the Attorney
General agreed. Bamford recalled a meeting with NSA and Justice
Department officials. "They threatened to use the espionage statute against
me," Bamford recounted, "if I continued to refuse to return the
documents." 20 A letter from the Justice Department soon followed: "You are
currently in possession of classified information that requires protection against
unauthorized disclosure," it said, adding that Bamford should be aware of his
"continuing obligation not to publish or communicate the information." 21
Keeping quiet was not enough for the Justice Department, however. "It
is ...your duty and obligation as a United States citizen to return this
information to the Department of Justice," the letter insisted. 22 Despite
these threats, Bamford published the classified information in The Puzzle

15 Judith Miller, US. Is Demanding Return of Papers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1982, at A19 ; see also
1984: Civil Liberties Hearings, supra note 6, at 37; James Bamford, How I Got the N.S.A. Files ...
How Reagan Tried to Get Them Back, THE NATION, Nov. 6,1982, at 466.
16 Bamford, supra note 15, at 466.

17 1984: Civil Liberties Hearings, supra note 6, at 37, 40.
18 Id. at 40.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 37, 40.

21 Id.at 40.
22 Miller, supra note 15. Bamford's attorney received a similar missive threatening a "postpublication judicial remedy." Bamford, supra note 15, at 468.
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Palace, his book about the NSA, which he called "the only book in history to
have been totally unclassified as it was being written, yet top secret by the
24
time it was published."23 He was never prosecuted.
Retroactive classification has also been used to impede congressional
oversight. In 2ooo, a congressional subcommittee held hearings on the
development of the national missile defense system. 2 The program's auditor
made approximately fifty recommendations for improving the testing
regime. 26 Those recommendations were delivered to Congress in public
testimony, discussed by the media, and published in the CongressionalRecord.
But four years later, when the subcommittee sought to follow up on those
recommendations, it learned that the Defense Department had retroactively
classified them. 27 The retroactive classification prevented the subcommittee
from discussing the recommendations in open session, where the program
would be subject to public scrutiny. This classification also barred the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) from issuing a public report on
the matter. Representatives Henry Waxman and John Tierney accused the
Pentagon of making a "highly dubious" classification decision in "an attempt
to stymie public debate." 2 The retroactive classification, they complained,
would have "absolutely no effect on whether our adversaries can gain access
to this information," but would instead "prevent members of Congress from
being able to issue thorough and thoughtful critiques of Administration
29
actions in a public forum."
Retroactive classification also struck the Senate Judiciary Committee
after it attempted to investigate misconduct inside the FBI. Sibel Edmonds,
a translator working for the FBI, complained that her colleagues were
purposefully leaving intelligence intercepts unanalyzed and notifying
30
targets of FBI surveillance that the government was listening in.
Concerned by these allegations, Senators Chuck Grassley and Patrick Leahy
wrote to the Justice Department's Inspector General. Their inquiry
23 1984: Civil Liberties Hearings,supra note 6, at 37.
24 Telephone Interview with James Bamford, Journalist (Nov. 6, 2013).
25 National Missile Defense: Test Failures and Technology Development: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Nat'l Sec., Veterans Affairs, and Int'l Relations of the H. Comm. on Gov't Reform, so6th
Cong. (2000).

26 Id. at 96-1oo; Waxman &Tierney Letter, supra note 3, at 1-2.
27 Waxman & Tierney Letter, supra note 3, at 1-2.
28 Id. at 4.
29 Id.; see also Too Many Secrets Hearing,supra note 2, at 7 (statement of Rep. Dennis Kucinich)
("Even in this committee, we saw how the Pentagon retroactively classified sections of a report
critical of the proposed national missile defense plan.").
30 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari for Plaintiff-Petitioner at 2, Edmonds v. Dep't of
Justice, 546 U.S. 1031 (200S)(No. 05-0190), 2005 WL 1902125, at *2.
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prompted the FBI to deliver two unclassified briefings to the Committee
about the allegations. 31 Based on the briefings, the senators wrote again to
the Inspector General, distributing their letters to the media and posting
them on their websites.3 2 One letter was even published in the
Congressional Record.3 3 But when Edmonds filed a wrongful termination
suit two years later, the Justice Department retroactively classified the
briefings. 34 An email to the Judiciary Committee warned: "Any staffer who
attended those briefings, or who learns about those briefings, should be
aware that the FBI now considers the information classified and should
therefore avoid further dissemination." 3 The email added that anyone with
36
notes from the briefings should contact the Office of Senate Security.
Senator Grassley was furious. In public hearings, he criticized FBI
Director Robert Mueller for the classification decision, which struck him as
"ludicrous because ... almost all of this information is in the public domain
and has been very widely available. '37 Grassley called this retroactive
classification a "very serious" incident that threw "a roadblock in front of
Congressional oversight" and attempted "to put a gag order on Congress." 38
His comments to the New York Times were just as critical: "To classify
something that's already been out in the public domain, what do you
accomplish? It does harm to transparency in government, and it looks like
an attempt to cover up the F.B.I.'s problems." 39 An aide added that
"[p]eople are puzzled and, frankly, worried, because the effect here is to
quash Congressional oversight. We don't even know what we can't talk
40
about."

31 Eric Lichtblau, Material Given to Congress in 2002 Is Now Classified, N.Y. TIMES, May 20,
2004, at Ai8.

32 Declaration of Danielle Brian in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and
Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 8-1o, Project on Gov't Oversight v. Ashcroft, No.
04-1032 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2004).

33 148 CONG. REC. S5843-44 (daily ed. June 20, 2002) (Letter from Patrick Leahy and
Charles Grassley, Sens., to Glen A. Fine, Inspector Gen., Dep't of Justice).
34 See Emerging Threats: Overclassificationand Pseudo-Classification:HearingBefore the Subcomm.
on Nat'l Sec., Emerging Threats, and Int'l Relations of the H. Comm. on Gov't Reform, io9th Cong. 147,
147-48 (2005) (statement of Sibel Edmonds); see also Brief for National Security Archive et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 14, Edmonds v. Dep't of Justice, 546 U.S. 1031 (2005) (No.
05-0190).

35 Declaration of Danielle Brian, supra note 32, at 9-1o; see also Lichtblau, supra note 31.
36 Declaration of Danielle Brian, supra note 32, at lo.
37 FBI Oversight: Terrorism and Other Topics: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 1o8th
Cong. 16 (2004) [hereinafter FBI Oversight Hearings] (statement of Sen. Grassley).
38 Id.
39 Lichtblau, supra note 31.
40 Id.
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Retroactive classification does not just target documents in the news. In
fact, the largest known instance of retroactive classification took place at the
National Archives and involved historical records that had been largely
forgotten. Between 1999 and 2006, the CIA, the Air Force, the Department
of Energy, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency retroactively
classified more than 25,000 documents and removed them from the public
shelves of the National Archives. 4' A number of these documents dated back
to World War II and the Korean War and had already appeared in historical
collections published by the government.42 This aggressive reclassification
did not come to light until Matthew Aid, a national security researcher,
noticed that records he had previously photocopied were no longer publicly
available. 4 His questions led the National Archives to admit to the
existence of the secret classification program, and the ensuing uproar
prompted the only audit to date of retroactive classification. 44 Significantly,
the audit found that more than thirty-five percent of the retroactive
classification was "questionable" or "clearly inappropriate," 4 a proportion
that Allen Weinstein, then Archivist of the United States, called
"stunning[ly] large., 46
What documents were caught in this retroactive dragnet? As it turns
out, many of them hardly seem worthy of classification. The documents
included a 1962 telegram translating a Belgrade news article about China's
nuclear abilities, 47 a 1950s document entitled Feasibility of Participatingin
48
Exchange Program with USSR to Study Highway Transportationin the USSR,
49
and a World War II-era study of the Soviet Union's agriculture capacity.
Further complicating matters, the government had already published many

41 INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, NAT'L ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN., AUDIT
REPORT: WITHDRAWAL OF RECORDS FROM PUBLIC ACCESS AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION FOR CLASSIFICATION PURPOSES 1 (2oo6), available at

http://www.archives.gov/isoo/reports/2006-audit-report.pdf. The auditors explained that "severe time
constraints" prevented them from looking into all areas of the retroactive classification program. Id. at 27.
42 Scott Shane, US. Reclassifies Many Documents in Secret Review, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006,
at Ai; Classifying Toothpaste, supra note 5.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, supra note 41, at 1, 16.

46 Allen Weinstein, Archivist of the United States, Remarks on Next Steps, at s (Apr. 2oo6),
availableat http://www.archives.gov/isoo/reports/weinstein-remarks.pdf.
47 Shane, supra note 42; Editorial, Government's Drowning in a Sea of Secrets, THE DAILY NEWS
(June 5, 2oo8), http://tdn.com/news/ pinioneditoriallgovernment-s-drowning-in-a-sea-of-secrets/article_
d9cf3ad6-42c8- 5 74 d-9df2-b92b2f33c8do.html, archivedat http://perma.cc/6VF 4 -GXGE.
48 See Classifying Toothpaste, supra note 5.

49 Eric Lichtblau, The Obama Administration's Commitment to Transparency: 4 Progress Report,
77 SOC. RES. 975, 977-78 (2010).
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of these documents in various anthologies, including the State Department's
series Foreign Relations of the United States. 0 The documents published in the
State Department's series included two CIA memos from 1948. One
explored the possible effect of winter conditions on a scheme to use hot air
balloons to drop propaganda over the Soviet bloc.51 The other discussed the
bad press the CIA was receiving for failing to predict anti-American riots in
Colombia.5 2 In addition to the documents published in the State Department
series, the government permitted many more to be microfilmed by
LexisNexis and Gale.5 3 Matthew Aid estimated that at least forty percent of
the documents classified by the Air Force, for example, had already been
published in these microform collections.5 4 Needless to say, this retroactive
55
classification raised some eyebrows.
In each of the cases above-and in others discussed below-the government
disclosed documents through official channels and then circled back to
retroactively classify them. While the full extent of retroactive classification
56
remains unknown, the concerns raised by this power are significant.

50 See Matthew M. Aid, Declassification in Reverse: The US. Intelligence Community's Secret
Historical Document Reclassification Program, NAT'L SEC. ARCHIVE (Feb. 21, 2oo6), http://
www2.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB'7 9 (last visited Feb. 27, 2014), archived at http://
perma.cc/JY9W-GRLE (discussing the reclassification of over 55,000 pages of records that were
publicly available at the National Archives).
51 Memorandum from Commander Robert Jay Williams to Cassady, Chief, Special Procedures
Corp. (July 23, 1948), available at http://www2.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB17 9/Aid-7.pdf.
The memo concluded the cold weather would greatly diminish the project's value. Id.
52 Note from Humelsine to Jack on the Publicity on Bogota Intelligence Reports (1948),
availableat http://www2.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB'7 9 /Aid-6.pdf.
53 Telephone Interview with Matthew Aid, Researcher (Oct. 26, 2013) (notes on file with
author).
54

Id.

55 See, e.g., Classifying Toothpaste, supra note 5 ("[Y]ou don't need to be a classification expert
to know that at least some of this reclassification wasn't only inappropriate-it was just plain
dumb."); Editorial, Finding the Wrong Answer, USA TODAY, Apr. 14, 2oo6, at A2o ("For the
intelligence community, trying to white-out what was once public information just discredits its
legitimate concerns about today's real secrets."); Scott Shane, Why the Secrecy? Only the Bureaucrats
Know, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2006, at C 4 ("Secrecy comes as instinctively to bureaucrats as dambuilding does to beavers.").
56 The Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) promised to follow up on the extent
of the retroactive classification, but no such follow-up has appeared. INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT
OFFICE, supra note 41, at 9, 13, 16, 20 & n.21. Nor are there any government-wide statistics on
retroactive classification. ISOO reports a handful of cases each year, but its numbers are vastly
under-inclusive because they do not count retroactive classification that takes place outside of the
executive order's reporting requirements-an issue taken up in depth later on. Telephone
Interview with William J. Bosanko, Chief Operating Officer, Nat'l Archives and Records Admin.,
Former Dir., Info. Sec. Oversight Office (Nov. 1, 2013) (notes on file with author); see also infra
subsection I.C.2-3.
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B. The History of Retroactive Classification

To understand the origins of retroactive classification, it helps to look
briefly at the development of the classification system as a whole. The
current security classification system consists of three tiers: "top secret,"
"secret," and "confidential." 7 "Top secret" covers information that could be
expected to cause "exceptionally grave" damage to national security if
disclosed. 8 "Secret" covers information expected to do "serious damage" if
revealed. s9 And "confidential" applies to documents whose disclosure would
be expected to cause "damage" that is neither "serious" nor "exceptionally
grave." 60 The classification rules govern internal access to government
information, but they also affect what individuals outside government can
do with the information. This effect on outsiders is the focus of the Article.
Americans take the classification system for granted. References to it
abound in popular culture. 61 Business organizations have even adopted their
own versions of the tiers of secrecy.62 But in the long history of government

secrets-a history that reaches back to the constitutional debates
themselves-the classification system is relatively new.63 Indeed, it was not
until 1940 that the formal system for classifying documents started to
emerge. In that year, President Franklin Roosevelt issued Executive Order
8381, which adopted a set of rules for classifying military documents. 64 The
classification system gained traction over the course of World War II and
the first years of the Cold War.6" In 1951, President Harry Truman issued an
57 Exec. Order No. 13,526, § 1.7,3 C.F.R. 298, 302 (2oo), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 3161 app.
(2012).
58 Id § 1.2(a)(1).

5 Id. § 1.2(a)(2).
60 Id. § 1.2(a)(3).
61 See, e.g., Todd Wilbur's Top Secret Recipes, TOP SECRET RECIPES, http://www.topsecretrecipes.com/

home.php (last visited Feb. 27, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/6SBG-DZ8H; Top Secret, OFFICE
PLAYGROUND,

http://www.officeplayground.com/Top-Secret-P216.aspx

(last visited Feb.

27,

2014), archivedat http://perma.cc/LCS2-8VBF.
62 See, e.g., Rafael Etges & Karen McNeil, UnderstandingData Classification Based on Business and
Security Requirements, 5 INFO. SYS. CONTROL J. ONLINE 1, 4 fig.2 (2o06), available at
http://www.isaca.org/journal/Past-Issues/2oo6Nolume-5/Documents/jopdfo6o5-understanding-data.pdf
63 See Louis Henkin, The Right to Know and the Duty to Withhold: The Case of the Pentagon
Papers, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 271, 273 (1971) ("From our national beginnings, the Government of the
United States has asserted the right to conceal and, therefore, in practical effect not to let the
people know."); see also ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 332 (1973)
("[T]he republic was conceived in secrecy.").
64 Richard C. Ehlke & Harold C. Relyea, The Reagan Administration Order on Security
Classification:A CriticalAssessment, 30 FED. BAR NEWS &J. 91, 92 (Feb. 1983).
65 See John Cloud, American Cartographic Transformations During the Cold War, 29
CARTOGRAPHY & GEOGRAPHIC INFO. SCI. 261, 264 (2002) ("American scientific and technical
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executive order extending the military's classification rules to "all
66
departments and agencies of the Executive Branch of the Government."
In the decades since President Roosevelt established the classification
system, Presidents have incrementally modified it through nine executive
orders. 67 President Dwight Eisenhower reduced the number of tiers of
classified information from four to three. 68 President Jimmy Carter ordered
automatic declassification of all but "top secret" documents after six years. 69
President Ronald Reagan put the automatic declassification on hold and
decreed that "[i]nformation shall be classified as long as required by national
security considerations."70 For all the changes made by the various executive
orders, however, the structure of the classification system today is essentially
the same as it was in 1940. The difference is that the number of classified
documents has skyrocketed. In 1982, the government classified seventeen
million documents.7 1 In 2012, the government classified more than ninetyfive million. 72 Experts estimate the universe of classified documents to be
73
between four billion and one trillion-but no one knows the exact figure.
And the growth of the classification system has been even more pronounced
74
in the decade since the September iith terrorist attacks.
In this slow progression of executive orders, the history of retroactive
classification begins in 1978, when President Carter's executive order
became the first to mention retroactive classification.7" The order banned
the practice by stating that "[c]lassification may not be restored to

mobilization for the Second World War was accompanied by broad adoption of compartmentalized
security systems and secrecy protocols.")
66 Exec. Order No. 10,290, 3 C.F.R. 789 (1949-1953), revoked by Exec. Order No. 1o,5o1, 3
C.F.R. 979 (1949-1953), as amended by 3 C.F.R. 292 (1971), 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1970).
67 See ARVIN S. QUIST, SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION 72 tbl.3 .s.C (2002),

available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/quist; see also Exec. Order 12,958, § 1.7(c), 3 C.F.R. 333,
338 (1996), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 435 (1996); Exec. Order No. 13,526, §1.7(c), 3 C.F.R. 298, 30203 (2010), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 435 (2o11).

68 Exec. Order No. 10501, 3 C.F.R. 459 (1967). President Truman added a fourth tier. Exec.
Order No. 10,290, § 2, 3 C.F.R. 471-472 (1952).
69 Exec. Order No. 12,o65, § 1-401,3 C.F.R. 190, 193 (1979).
70 Exec. Order No. 12,356, § 1.4(a), 3 C.F.R. 166, 169 (1983).
71 INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT FY 1982, at 1
(1983), available at http://www.archives.gov/isoo/reports/1982-annual-report.pdf.
72 INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT FY 2012, at 7
(2013), available at http://www.archives.gov/isoo/report/2012-annual -report.pdf.
73 See Peter Galison, Removing Knowledge, 31 CRITICAL INQUIRY 229, 230-31 (2004), available

at http://www.fas.harvard.edu/-hsdept/bios/docs/Removing%2oKnowledge.pdf.
74 See Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, A Hidden World, Growing Beyond Control, WASH.
POST, July 19, 2OlO, at As, available at http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/

articles/a-hidden-world-growing-beyond-control/print.
75 Exec. Order No. 12,o65,3 C.F.R. 190 (1979).
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documents already declassified and released to the public under this Order
or prior Orders. '76 Was this a preemptive ban or a response to some existing
problem? Steven Garfinkel, the director of the Information Security
Oversight Office at the time, said the order was not a response to any
particular instance of retroactive classification. 7 Rather, he stated, it was
part of the executive order's larger message that openness would be the
78
order of the day.
Four years later, in 1982, President Reagan took a different tack with his
order on the classification system. In general, President Reagan's order was
seen as "clearly revers[ing]" a thirty-year trend toward declassification by
emphasizing the need for secrecy over openness. 79 When it came to
retroactive classification in particular, President Reagan's order allowed the
president or an agency head to "reclassify information previously
declassified and disclosed," provided that "(1) the information requires
protection in the interest of national security; and (2) the information may
80
reasonably be recovered."
The new classification power encountered profound skepticism during
congressional hearings that year. Morton Halperin, who had served on
President Richard Nixon's National Security Council, outlined what he saw
as "very serious constitutional problems." 81 He feared that people might
receive unclassified documents or hear unclassified remarks at a public
meeting, only to discover later on that the information had been
retroactively classified. 82 This is "a position which many private citizens,
journalists and scholars, strive to not ever get into," Halperin said, "a
position where they know classified information that they are not supposed
to disseminate further. '83 Historian Anna K. Nelson warned of the effect of
retroactive classification on memoirs, autobiographies, and interviews of
former officials. Not only would retroactive classification "encourag[e] the
distortion of history," but it would also harm future decisionmaking. 84 "The
knowledge that documents and records are equally available to all has kept
76 Exec. Order No. 12,o65, § 1-607, 3 C.F.R. 190, 195 (1979).

77 Telephone Interview with Steven Garfinkel, Former Dir., Info. Sec. Oversight Office
(Oct. 11, 2013) (notes on file with author).
78 Id.
79 Ehlke & Relyea, supra note 64, at 96.

80 Exec. Order No. 12,356, § 1.6(c), 3 C.F.R. 166, 170 (1983) (emphasis added).
81 Executive Order on Security Classification:Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on
Gov't Operations, 9 7th Cong. 56 (1982) [hereinafter Executive Order on Security Classification
Hearings].
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 110 (statement of Anna K. Nelson).
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many a participant an honest observer," Nelson said. She continued: "This
85
provision has no place in a representative democracy."
In the face of much criticism, the administration sent two officials to the
hearings to defend retroactive classification. These officials described
retroactive classification as a modest tool for cleaning up the occasional
mistake in the declassification process. Steven Garfinkel, the director of the
Information Security Oversight Office, explained that President Carter's
executive order had been "inflexible" in the sense that a document
accidentally declassified and released could never be reclassified even if it
"was in the hands of one person ... quite willing" to give it back. 86
Retroactive classification would fix that problem, Garfinkel insisted, by
allowing the government to put the information safely behind the veil of
87
classification.
But what if the recipient of a declassified document refused to return it?
The executive order said documents would be retroactively classified only if
they could "reasonably be recovered."88 The subcommittee pressed
Garfinkel and Deputy Assistant Attorney General Richard Willard. "What
type of recovery action is reasonable?" asked Representative Ted Weiss. 89
Would lying be reasonable? Would force? Weiss pointed to recent reports of
a researcher who had received declassified documents from the National
Archives and then, at the request of the Archives, sent the documents
back. 90 When the government received the documents, it retroactively
classified eleven pages of them and refused to return them to the researcher
despite earlier assurances that the researcher would get everything back. 91

85 Id.

86 Id. at 179 (statement of Steven Garfinkel, Dir. of the Info. Security Oversight Office); see
also id. at 130-31 (statement of Steven Garfinkel); George Lardner, Jr., Officials Defend Deceit In
Retrieving Secrets, WASH. POST, May 6, 1982, at A5 (reporting that during the hearing, Garfinkel
took the stance that he would not rule out the use of deception in attempting to reclassify
documents).
87 Executive Orderon Security ClassificationHearings, supra note 81, at 179.

88 Exec. Order No. 12,356, § i.6(c), 3 C.F.R. 166, 170 (1983).
89 Executive Order on Security Classification Hearings, supra note 81,at 179 (statement of Rep.

Weiss).
90 Id. at 18o-81; see also George Lardner, Jr., Air Force Pulls Back on '53 Secret Papers, WASH.
POST, Apr. 5, 1982, at AS; George Lardner, Jr., Air Force Abandons Attempt To Reclassify Old
Documents, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 1982, at A2.
91 Lardner, Air Force Pulls Back on '53 Secret Papers, supra note 9o; see also Lardner, Air Force
Abandons Attempt to Reclassify Old Documents, supra note 90. Notably, at the time, President Carter's
executive order banned retroactive classification. Exec. Order No. 12,o65, § 1-607, 3 C.F.R. 190, 195

(1979). After two unflattering articles in the Washington Post, the government reversed its
retroactive classification decision. Lardner, Air Force Abandons Attempt to Reclassify Old Documents,
supra note 90.
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The incident left the subcommittee concerned about the breadth of what
the administration might consider reasonable. Both Garfinkel and Willard
said that deception was not preferred but could be used in certain
circumstances. 92 While Willard assured the subcommittee that force would
not be used to retrieve a document, Garfinkel did not "want to be on the
record to say that could never happen."93 These equivocal assurances did
little to assuage the subcommittee's concerns that the power would be
abused.
At the end of the back-and-forth, Representative Weiss was still
concerned. He asked about the classification status of records that had been
stolen from the overrun American embassy in Iran and disseminated
throughout the world. 94 An American researcher, returning home with some
of these documents, had them confiscated by customs. 9 "Why," asked
Weiss, "would the U.S. government have to prevent the American citizens
from seeing information, classified or not, that is circulating freely
elsewhere in the world?" 96 The question sounds eerily familiar in the wake
of the WikiLeaks and Edward Snowden disclosures. "If something is widely
known throughout the world, then it is hard for me to see how an additional
disclosure would cause damage to the national security," Willard, the Justice
Department official, responded. 97 "[Ilt is hard for me to see that there
would be a justification for classifying information that was widely
circulating throughout the world."9 8 And yet, that is exactly how retroactive
classification has been used-to classify information that is already widely
known.
C. The Rules Governing Retroactive Classification
This Section explains how, in the Internet Age, the rules governing
retroactive classification provide no effective constraint on the practice's
use. To see why the rules are flawed, it is necessary to examine the three
different methods of retroactive classification. The remainder of Part I
discusses the rules that apply to each.

92 Executive Orderon Security Classification Hearings,supra note 81, at 181.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 182-83.

95Id.
96 Id.at 183.
97 Id.
98 Id.
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1.Retroactive Reclassification
With retroactive reclassification, the document starts out as classified.
The government then declassifies it and releases it to the public.
Somewhere down the line, the government decides to classify it again. This
is the type of retroactive classification discussed in the executive order,
which says:
(c) Information may not be reclassified after declassification and release to
the public under proper authority unless:

(2) the information may be reasonably recovered without bringing
undue attention to the information;

(3)the reclassification action is reported promptly to the Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs (National Security Advisor) and
the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office. 99
Under the current executive order, and under President Reagan's and
President George W. Bush's as well, the key provision is the one limiting
retroactive classification to information that can be "reasonably recovered."100
That is because retroactive classification seems most absurd when widely
known information suddenly becomes secret. The executive order's
implementing regulations attempt to prevent that outcome by defining
"reasonably recovered" to mean situations where "[m]ost individual
recipients or holders are known and can be contacted and all instances of the
information to be reclassified will not be more widely disseminated." 10 1
The goal is to limit retroactive classification to information that can

actually be blotted from the public domain, but the rule cannot live up to
that goal. In this age of rapid electronic communications, where information
can be instantaneously copied and republished by anyone with Internet
access, it is impossible to know whether something can be reasonably
recovered. For the government to know that "most" recipients of the
document can be contacted, it would have to know how far the information
99 Exec. Order No. 13,526, § 1.7(c)(2)-(3), 3 C.F.R. 298, 302 (2010). Special procedures exist
for documents in the "physical and legal custody" of the National Archives. Id. § i.7(c)(4).
100 Exec. Order No. 13,292, § 1.7(c)(2), 3 C.F.R. 196, 200 (2004); see also Exec. Order No.
12,356, § 1.6(c), 3 C.F.R. 166, 169 (1983).
101 Classified National Security Information, 32 C.F.R. § 200.1 3 (b)(i)(i) (201o). Every
president to allow retroactive classification has employed a similar definition of "reasonably
recovered." See, e.g., Classified National Security Directive No. 1, 32 C.F.R. § 200113(a)(1) (2004);
Classified National Security Information, 32 C.F.R. § 20o.6 (1982).
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has spread. But once a document is posted online, that is not possible. And
this problem does not just apply to information already online. There is a
good chance that any document released, even if only in paper form, is
headed online; even if it is not yet online, it can be uploaded at any moment
and quickly reproduced. The notion of tracking down information and
determining how far it has spread may have been practical in 1982, but it is
not in 2015.102 One need look no further than the WikiLeaks and Edward
Snowden disclosures to see the impossibility of tracking down and
recovering information that has made it onto the Internet 03 In fact, the
federal government still does not know the full extent of the disclosures
today. 10 4 Thus, in today's networked world, retroactive classification's
"reasonably recovered" standard is just not implementable.
Of course, the government could take the uncertainty about a
document's recoverability as a sign that it should refrain from retroactive
classification. But that is not what the government has done. Rather, the
government has gone forward with retroactive classification in spite of the
uncertainty. And, as discussed below, much retroactive classification does
not even pay lip service to the executive order's recoverability and reporting
requirements.
Before discussing the other methods of retroactive classification,
however, it is important to note another feature of the executive order, a
feature with implications far beyond national security law. Retroactive
classification's implementing regulations boldly assert that members of the
public have an obligation not to reveal classified information that the
government has released to them:

102 This is especially true with the so-called Deep Web. See generally Lev Grossman & Jay
Newton-Small, The Secret Web: Where Drugs, Porn and Murder Live Online, TIME, Nov. 11,
2013, at
28, 28, available at http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/o,9171,2i 5 62 71,oo.html#ixzz2q
OpDfbse. President Obama's order seems more aware than its forerunners that the government
releases information online. See Exec. Order No. 13,526, 3 C.F.R. 183 (2010). When the
government makes information available on one of its websites, the implementing regulations
state, no retroactive classification can take place until "consideration is given as to the number of
times the information was accessed, the form of access, and whether the information at issue has
been copied, referenced, or publicized." 32 C.F.R. § 2001.13(b)(i)(iii) (2olo). But this provision
does not apply to government information posted on private websites. See Telephone Interview
with William J. Bosanko, supra note 56.
103See Scott Shane & Andrew W. Lehren, Leaked Cables Offer a Raw Look Inside US.
Diplomacy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2OLO, at Al; see also Mark Mazzetti & Michael S. Schmidt, ExC.I.A. Worker Says He Disclosed US. Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, June so, 2013, at Al.
104Mark Mazzetti & Michael S. Schmidt, Officials Say US. May Never Know Extent of Leaks
From Spy Agency, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5,2013, at Ai.
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The recipients or holders who do not have security clearances shall, to the
extent practicable, be appropriately briefed about the reclassification of the
information that they have had access to, their obligation not to disclose the
information, and be requested to sign an acknowledgement of this
t05
briefing
This is quite a radical statement. It foists an "obligation" of
confidentiality on someone without a security clearance, someone who has
never bargained for nor agreed to such a duty. But where do we find the
authority for such an obligation? The executive order and its implementing
regulations do not say. Nor do they specify the scope of the obligation. Does
the obligation apply only to citizens? Does it include resident aliens? Does
it apply to an Australian national operating a website in Sweden?10 6 Again,
there are no answers.
The notion of such an obligation is particularly interesting because it
echoes a recurring dissent in Supreme Court case law that everyday
Americans have a duty to keep the government's secrets. This obligation
was epitomized in Chief Justice Burger's Pentagon Papers dissent, in which
he referred to "one of the basic and simple duties of every citizen with
respect to the discovery or possession of stolen property or government
documents. That duty, I had thought-perhaps naively-was to report
forthwith, to responsible public officers."'0 7 Chief Justice Burger went on to
say that the obligation fell upon "taxi drivers, Justices, and the New York
Times.'10 8 Justice Blackmun's dissent in that case also discussed the
obligation to keep the government's secrets. Justice Blackmun warned that
media outlets should be "fully aware of their ultimate responsibilities to the
United States of America" because, if leaks harmed the country, "people will
know where the responsibility for these sad consequences rests."'10 9 The
pages of the United States Reports contain many other such references.
Retroactive classification is fascinating for its willingness to endorse the
idea that people outside government bear this obligation of secrecy." 0

105 Classified National Security Information, 32 C.F.R. § 2001.13(b)( 3 ) (2010)

(emphasis

added).
106 See Danny O'Brien, Technicalities: to Questions on WikiLeaks, COMM. To PROTECT
JOURNALISTS (Apr. 8, 2010, 5:33 PM), http://cpj.org/blog/2oo/o4/technicalities-lo-questions-onwikileaks.php, archived at http://perma.cc/53T7-KUK2.
107 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 751 (1971) [hereinafter Pentagon
Papers] (Burger, C.J., dissenting).

108 Id.
109 Id. at 762-63 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

110 See, e.g., Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 547-48 n.2 (1989) (White, J., dissenting); Neb.
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 560 (1976). But see, e.g., Oral Argument at 34:43, Fla. Star v.
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The executive order thus creates an uneasy combination. It provides no
effective constraint on the government's ability to retroactively classify
documents, even as it foists an extraordinary duty of confidentiality on
members of the public. The irony, as the following discussion will show, is
that the other methods of retroactive classification are more lawless-more
willing to duck even the weak limitations imposed by the executive order.
2.

Retroactive "Original" Classification

The second method, retroactive "original" classification, is very similar
to retroactive reclassification. The only difference is that the document
starts off unclassified, rather than classified. The government releases this
unclassified document to the public and later on decides to classify it.
Because the document was not classified to begin with, it is considered an
"original" classification, not a reclassification, and thus does not have to
comport with the "reasonably recovered" and reporting requirements of the
executive order."' This allows retroactive classification to fly below the
radar. As Bill Leonard, a former director of the Information Security
Oversight Office, confirmed: "[W]here an actual report is released to the
public in a non-classified format and someone comes behind later on [to
classify it] ... that may be something that is very dumb but is not

112
prohibited by the executive order."
Examples of retroactive original classification include the following
events:
In 2011, the military posted a report online about Afghan soldiers'
attacks on their American colleagues."' The report concluded that
the resentment driving this violence was far deeper than the
military had previously acknowledged.114 Shortly before the Wall
Street Journal reported on the findings, however, the military
retroactively classified the report, even though it remained publicly
accessible on the Internet."5

B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (No. 87-0329), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/198o-1989/1988/
1988-87-329 ("Unidentified Justice: '[Ihf somebody comes over and hands me a classified
document that he's not supposed to give me, and I look at it[,] I haven't violated the law."').
111See Exec. Order No. 13,526, § 1.7(c), 3 C.F.R. 298, 302 (2010).

112 Telephone Interview with Bill Leonard, Former Dir., Info. Sec. Oversight Office (Oct. 9,
2013) (notes on file with author).

113See Dion Nissenbaum, Report Sees Danger in LocalAllies, WALL ST. J.,
June 17, 2o11, at A8.
114Id.

115Id. A New York Times article explained that the report "was first distributed in early May
2011 as unclassified and was later changed to classified." Matthew Rosenberg, Afghanistan's Soldiers

Step Up Killings of Allied Forces, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2o12/o/
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" In 2010, the Washington Post disclosed that Kabul Bank had diverted

*

$850 million of its holdings to government insiders." 6 The U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) concluded that
Deloitte, the accounting firm USAID had paid to help Kabul Bank
keep the books, should have detected the fraud.'17 USAID released
an unclassified report describing its findings, but two months later,
the agency retroactively classified it, even though the report was
118
still available online.
In 2007, the GAO presented an unclassified report to Congress
about corruption in Iraq. 119 After the report was presented in public
hearings and distributed to the press, the State Department
retroactively classified some of the documents on which the report
relied, thus forcing the GAO to remove portions of the report. 12 0
Again, this retroactive classification occurred even though the
information had already been publicly released. 21 This and two
other incidents of retroactive classification so incensed Congress
that 395 members of the House voted for a resolution
22

condemning the practice.
In all of these instances, an unclassified document became classified after
it entered the public domain. Granted, there are some limitations on
original classification, but they are so lenient that officials joke that "you
could easily classify the ham sandwich" under the original classification
provisions. 23 Retroactive "original" classification is thus an easy way for

20/world/asia/afghan-soldiers-step-up-killings-of-allied-forces.htm?pagewanted-all,

archived at http:/f

perma.cc/K95R-5ZLW.
116 Andrew Higgins, Banker Feeds Afghan Crony Capitalism,WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2olo, at Ai;
Al Kamen, Now You See the Kabul Bank, Now You Don't, WASH. POST (May 12, 2011),
http://articles.washingtonpost.Om/211-05-12/pOlitics/35265138-1usaid-energy-resources-kabulbank, archived at http://perma.cc/5HKT-WNNR.

117 Steven Aftergood, Report on Kabul Bank Corruption Is Classified, Taken Offline, SECRECY
NEWS (May 10, 2011), http://blogs.fas.org/secrecy/2o11/o5/kabul_bank, archived at http://
perma.cc/JH6G-LP8V.
118 Id.

119 Examining the Effectiveness of US. Efforts to Combat Waste, Fraud,Abuse, and Corruption in
Iraq: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Appropriations, isoth Cong. 99, 102 (2008) (response of
Comptroller General David Walker); 153 CONG. REC. 11,551, 11,577 (2007). Stuart Bowen, the

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, was "aware of reports that draft documents
were made available to the media and that subsequently drafts were marked as classified," but had
"not formally reviewed these incidents." Id. at 14.
120 153 CONG. REC. 11,551, 11,577 (2007).
121 Id.
122 Id. at 11,585.

123 Telephone Interview with William J. Bosanko, supra note 56; see also Exec. Order No.
13,526, 3 C.F.R. 298 (2010).

1058

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 163: 137

officials bent on secrecy to employ the retroactive classification power
without reporting their actions or worrying about whether the information
can be "reasonably recovered."
3. Retroactive Classification of Inadvertently
Declassified Documents
The third method of retroactive classification completely skirts the
executive order by asserting that the order does not apply to documents
inadvertently declassified in the first place. The logic is that the executive
order refers to information declassified and released "under proper
authority," so if the information was inadvertently declassified and released,
it did not become public "under proper authority."124 Thus, the order's
limitations and reporting requirement do not apply. Or so the argument
goes. "What often happens," explained attorney Mark Zaid, "is they say, 'It
125
was never properly declassified, so we're not properly reclassifying it.""
This reasoning was on display in the National Archives scandal.
Matthew Aid, the researcher who uncovered the secret retroactive
classification program, recalls a meeting during where the CIA's
classification chief said, "the documents in question had been found to have
been improperly declassified and that the law gave the CIA and the Air
Force the authority" to treat those documents as classified. 26 Similarly, the
official audit of the retroactive classification noted that the classification
authorities had "determined that because of the many mistakes [in
declassification], this was not reclassification." 127 The semantics of all these
different classification actions are so convoluted that officials have even
128
referred to the National Archives scandal as a "un-declassification."
Among all the methods of retroactively classifying documents, this third
method is particularly dubious because it clashes with the historical
justification for retroactive classification. As discussed above, the Reagan
administration implemented retroactive classification to deal with precisely

124 Exec. Order No. 13,526 §1.7(c), 3 C.F.R. 298, 302-03 (2010).

125 Telephone Interview with Mark Zaid, Managing Partner, Mark S. Zaid, P.C. (Oct. 18,
2013) (notes on file with author).

126 Telephone Interview with Matthew Aid, supra note 53.
127 INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, supra note 41, at 9.
128 The agencies needed a creative excuse to legitimize their actions. For the first half of the
program, President Clinton's executive order banned retroactive classification. Exec. Order No.
12,958, 3 C.F.R. 333 (1996). For the second half, while President George W Bush's order permitted
reclassification, it imposed a reporting requirement that the agencies disobeyed. Exec. Order
13,292 § 1.7(c)(3), 3 C.F.R. 196, 200 (2004). Retroactive "original" classification was not an option
because the documents had been classified initially.
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the issue of documents that had been inadvertently declassified and
released. As a Justice Department official told Congress in 1982, "[pleople
are only human" and retroactive classification "gives us the power in some
situations to try to rectify mistakes." 129 In light of this history, it is hard to
say that the executive order does not apply if the document was declassified
by mistake. That the agencies can get away with this line of argument
suggests the lawlessness of retroactive classification.

No matter what one calls these three methods of retroactive
classification, they all lead to the same result: documents the government
released to the public later become classified. The laws currently in place are
simply inadequate to deal with the retroactive classification power

II. CAN I BE PROSECUTED FOR DISOBEYING
RETROACTIVE CLASSIFICATION?

Now that we have seen how retroactive classification works, the question
is whether a retroactive classification decision can be enforced. If the
government provides me with a document today, and retroactively classifies
it tomorrow, do I have to refrain from publishing it? If I disobey the
classification decree, can I be punished?
This Part first looks at whether recipients of traditionally classified
documents can be prosecuted for disseminating them. In the wake of the
WikiLeaks and Edward Snowden disclosures, this question has become a
matter of intense scholarly debate. Next, this Part asks how the analysis
would differ if the documents were retroactively classified. Essentially, Part
II argues that, despite significant statutory and constitutional hurdles, a
prosecution based on retroactively classified documents could pass muster.
A. Classified Documents
There is no law against publishing classified documents per se. Rather, a
patchwork of criminal laws protects various types of information that
happens to be classified. The most prominent law in this patchwork is the
Espionage Act, which protects "information relating to the national
defense."'130 The Espionage Act is itself a patchwork of provisions covering

129 Executive Order on Security Classification Hearings, supra note 81, at
Richard Willard).
130 Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 792-799 (2012).
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everything from cloak-and-dagger espionage to activities more often
associated with journalism. 13 1 The most relevant provision for our purposes
is subsection 793(e), which punishes those who receive and redistribute
classified information. Specifically, the provision targets anyone who,
having unauthorized possession of. . . information relating to the national
defense which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used
to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation,
willfully communicates, delivers, transmits ... the same to any person not
entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it to
132
the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it.
By its terms, this provision would apply to someone outside the
government, such as a journalist or a member of the public, who receives
and publishes a classified document. Yet no journalist has ever been
prosecuted for publishing classified information, and only two members of
the public-other than those working for foreign governments-have been
prosecuted for disseminating information given to them by a government
source.

13 3

Indeed, leak recipients are typically seen as protected from prosecution.
When the government does decide to prosecute a leak, it usually goes after
the source, not the recipient. This practice is so entrenched that some
scholars have even attributed doctrinal significance to it, referring to it as
the "source/distributor divide." 134 But, in recent years, spurred on by the
WikiLeaks disclosures in particular, scholars have debated whether leak
recipients really are immune from prosecution under the Espionage Act.
Could someone who innocently received classified information be punished
for publishing it? The debate remains unsettled, perhaps because there have
been no cases with which to test each side's assumptions. The following

131 See id. § 793(e).
132 Id. Subsection 793(d) applies to those lawfully in possession of the information, and

subsection 793(g) targets "two or more persons [who] conspire to violate any of the ... provisions
of the section." Id. § 793(g).
133 See infra notes 159-165 and accompanying text; see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Government
Secrecy vs. Freedom of the Press, 1HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 185, 197 (2007).
134 David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones
Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512, 516 (2013); see also id. at 525 ("As
compared to the legal vulnerability of their government sources, journalists and other private
actors who publish leaked information appear to occupy a privileged position."). But see Heidi
Kitrosser, Free Speech Aboard the Leaky Ship of State: Calibrating First Amendment Protections for
Leakers of ClassifiedInformation, 6 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 409,411 (2013).
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discussion sets out the chief arguments for and against the success of such a
prosecution. 13s
1. Why an Espionage Act Prosecution Would Fail
The case that a prosecution would fail begins with the text of the
Espionage Act. Subsection 793(e) uses the verbs "communicates, delivers,
[and] transmits," but omits the word "publishes."136 One of the district court
judges in the Pentagon Papers case, for example, found the Espionage Act
inapplicable to the newspaper for that reason. 137 The judge wrote that if
Congress wanted to punish publication-as distinct from communicationit would have used the word "publishes," as other statutory provisions
surrounding the Espionage Act do. 138 Justice Marshall's Pentagon Papers
opinion added that this interpretation "has some support in the legislative
history."'39 However, Harold Edgar and Benno Schmidt, Jr., coauthors of
the seminal work on the Espionage Act, concluded that there is not "a single
clear statement in the lengthy legislative history of these bills that the word
'communicates' does not embrace publishing."140 Patricia Bellia has
explained that the use of the word "publishes" in surrounding statutory
provisions does not mean the expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon should
be invoked because the surrounding provisions either came from different
eras than the Espionage Act or dealt with much narrower categories of
classified information. 141 Thus, the significance of the omission of the word
"publishes" is very much a matter of debate.
The second significant argument for why such a prosecution would fail is
the Espionage Act's "bad faith" requirement. In Gorin v. United States, the
defendant, a Nazi agent, claimed that the Espionage Act provision under
135See Patricia L. Bellia, WikiLeaks and the Institutional Framework for National Security
Disclosures, 121 YALE L.J. 1448, 1495 (2012) ("[Clurrent doctrine does not resolve whether ...

the

government can punish ex post what it cannot stop the press from publishing ex ante."); MaryRose Papandrea, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and Scapegoats: The Press and National Security Information, 83
IND. L.J. 233, 264 (2008) ("Although it is not always clear whether this was Congress's intent, the
press plainly is vulnerable to indictment under these provisions."); id. at 280 ("[It is obvious that
the press cannot be confident that the Supreme Court would hold that a criminal prosecution of
the press for the publication of national security information is unconstitutional.").
136 See Bellia, supra note 13S, at 1487.
137 See United States v. New York Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324, 328-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); see

also Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. 713, 745 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring).
138 New York Times, 328 F. Supp. at 328-29; see also 18U.S.C. §§ 794(b), 797-798 (2012).
139Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. 713, 745 (1971) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
140 Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., The Espionage Statutes and Publication of Defense
Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 1034 (1973).
141 Bellia, supra note 135, at 149o.
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which he was convicted was unconstitutionally vague because it was not
clear what information could be communicated without transgressing the
42
Act.1 The Supreme Court held that the statute "requires those prosecuted
to have acted in bad faith." 4 3 Experts have noted that a "bad faith"
requirement would be hard to prove against members of the public,
including journalists, because the intent behind their publishing the
information may well be to serve the public good, not to aid a foreign
144
nation or hurt the United States.
Beyond the statutory arguments, however, many experts believe that this
type of Espionage Act prosecution would fail for First Amendment reasons.
Commentators point to Bartnicki v. Vpper and its forerunners, in which the
Supreme Court held unconstitutional state and federal provisions that
punished people for publishing truthful information that they had lawfully
received." 4 Florida Star and Cox Broadcasting concerned state laws against
publishing the names of rape victims. 1 46 Landmark Communications in turn
dealt with a state law enforcing the confidentiality of judicial misconduct
proceedings.147 Both Oklahoma Publishing and Daily Mail involved challenges
to prohibitions on publishing information about juvenile defendants. 148 And
Bartnicki itself concerned a federal law prohibiting the disclosure of the
contents of an intercepted phone call, even if the person making the
disclosure was not the one who intercepted the call. 1 49 Each of these cases
stood for the following proposition, summed up by the Supreme Court in
Daily Mail: "[I]f a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a
matter of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally
punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a state
interest of the highest order."'50
Many experts say this line of cases would protect one who publishes
classified documents, provided he did not break the law in obtaining them.
Yochai Benkler writes that any effort to prosecute the New York Times or the

142 Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 23 (1941).
143 Id. at 27-28.
144 Papandrea, supra note 135, at 266.
145 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001) (reasoning that "a stranger's illegal
conduct does not suffice to remove the First Amendment shield from speech about a matter of
public concern").
146 Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 526 (1989); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 47172 (1975).
147Landmark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 830, 845-46 (1978).
148 Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 98-99 (1979); Okla. Publ'g Co. v. Dist.
Court, 43o U.S. 3o8, 308 (1977).
149 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 518-19.
150 Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103.
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Guardian for their publication of the WikiLeaks cables, for example, "would
founder on the bulwarks of the First Amendment."'5 Jack Balkin argues that
"the government cannot punish the press if it obtained the information
lawfully and merely published what was leaked unless there would almost
certainly be very serious harm to the nation.' ' 52 Geoffrey Stone believes a
journalist could not be convicted for publishing classified information unless
the prosecution satisfied the same demanding standard required for a prior
restraint: Would publication "surely result in direct, immediate, and
irreparable damage to our Nation or its people?"15 3 Many experts put much
confidence in the power of the First Amendment to thwart an Espionage
Act prosecution. But not everyone agrees.
2. Why an Espionage Act Prosecution Would Succeed
Those who believe an Espionage Act prosecution could succeed focus
not on the potential statutory infirmities of the Espionage Act, but rather
154
on the First Amendment concerns that such a prosecution would raise.
Would the First Amendment block prosecution of someone who received,
but did not steal, classified documents and then proceeded to publish them?
The strongest evidence that the First Amendment would allow such a
prosecution may well come from the Pentagon Papers case, long considered a
resounding victory for the press. The Pentagon Papers case concerned the
government's request for a prior restraint to prevent the New York Times and
151 Yochai Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks and the Battle over the Soul of the
Networked Fourth Estate, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 311, 356 (2011).
152 Jack M. Balkin, The First Amendment Is an Information Policy, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 21
(2012).

153 Pentagon Papers,403 U.S. 713, 730 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring); see Stone, supra note 133,
at 202; see also Benkler, supra note i51, at 354 ("[T]he First Amendment does not permit
prosecution of a journalist transmitting truthful information of public interest absent a need of the
highest order." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Papandrea, supra note 135, at 28o-81. First
Amendment attorney Abbe Lowell had said courts would apply the "clear and present danger" test
in this scenario. Espionage Act and the Legal and Constitutional Issues Raised by WikiLeaks: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, lilth Cong. 34 n.lo (2010) [hereinafter WikiLeaks Hearing]
(statement of Abbe D. Lowell).
154 There has been much talk of amending the Espionage Act to better address current
threats to national security. For example, the SHIELD Act would have amended the Espionage
Act to make it a crime for downstream recipients to publish classified information concerning
"human intelligence" sources. See Securing Human Intelligence and Enforcing Lawful
Dissemination (SHIELD) Act, H.R. Res. 703, 112th Cong. (2oli); see also Michael A.
Lindenberger, The US.'s Weak Legal Case Against WikiLeaks, TIME (Dec. 9, 2oo),
http://content.time.com/time/
nation/articleo,8599,2o35994,oo.html, archived at http://perma.cc/M8X9-LJT 7 (quoting Senator
Mitch McConnell, who called for the prosecution of Julian Assange and said that, if the barriers to
prosecution "become[] a problem, we need to change the law").
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the Washington Post from publishing classified documents about the Vietnam
War.5 ' The Supreme Court held the prior restraint unconstitutional, but in
the dicta of the Court's separate opinions, a majority of the justices seemed
to believe that the First Amendment would have permitted a criminal
prosecution of the reporters who published the classified documents. 15 6 As
Justice Stewart wrote: "Undoubtedly Congress has the power to enact
specific and appropriate criminal laws to ...preserve government secrets.

Congress has passed such laws, and several of them are of very colorable
relevance to the apparent circumstances of these cases."157 The dicta in this
case support the claim that an Espionage Act prosecution would survive a
First Amendment challenge."' 8
Indeed, in 2006, a district court in Virginia relied on the PentagonPapers

dicta in allowing an Espionage Act prosecution of two lobbyists for the
American Israel Public Affairs Committee. 159 In that case, United States v.
Rosen, the lobbyists were charged with "conspiring to transmit information
relating to the national defense to those not entitled to receive it." 160 They
did not have security clearances, were not employed by the government, and
161
did not bribe their way to the classified information, much less steal it.
Instead, they built a relationship with a source inside the State Department,
and the source passed along the confidential information, much like sources
routinely do with journalists. 62 The two lobbyists then disseminated the
information to another lobbyist, a journalist, and a representative of the
Israeli government. 163 When they were prosecuted, the lobbyists asserted a
First Amendment defense, arguing that, because they were outside the
government, they had no special position of trust and were thus allowed to

155Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 714.
156 The arithmetic supporting this claim may be found, for instance, in a district court
opinion from 2006. United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 638-39 (E.D. Va. 2006).

157 Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring); see also id. at 737 (White, J.,
concurring) ("I would have no difficulty in sustaining convictions under these sections on facts
that would not justify the intervention of equity and the imposition of a prior restraint.").
158 Bellia, supra note 135, at 1470-71 ("[T]he opinions reveal the consensus of five Justices that
Congress either could have or did criminalize the conduct-a proposition that only Justice
Douglas (joined by Justice Black) explicitly rejected."); id. at 1495.
159See, e.g., Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 638 ("[A] close reading of these opinions indicates that
the result may have been different had the government sought to prosecute the newspapers under
§ 793(e) subsequent to publication of the Pentagon Papers.").
160 Id. at 607.
161 Id. at 6o8-1o.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 61o.
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disseminate the information they came across. 164 The district court
disagreed: "[B]oth common sense and the relevant precedent point
persuasively to the conclusion that the government can punish those outside
of the government for the unauthorized receipt and deliberate
retransmission of information relating to the national defense." 16 While the

government ultimately dropped the prosecution, the district court's
opinion-and its reliance on the Pentagon Papers dicta-is significant
because it suggests that an Espionage Act prosecution is viable despite the
First Amendment concerns.
Beyond the Pentagon Papers dicta, scholars who believe a prosecution
could survive First Amendment scrutiny have challenged the relevance of
the Bartnicki line of cases, on which the argument against prosecution
relies. 166 Their main reason for challenging the Bartnicki line of cases is the
fact that the statutes in those cases made publication of sensitive
information illegal, but did not forbid its receipt.' 67 The holding of Bartnicki,
for instance, is explicitly limited to information lawfully received. 6 The
Espionage Act, on the other hand, makes receipt illegal; thus, anyone who
republishes the classified information cannot claim that he received it
legally because receipt itself is against the law.169 Experts also distinguish
the Espionage Act from the Bartnicki line of cases because the Espionage
Act concerns national security secrets rather than the matters of personal
privacy dealt with in Bartnicki and its predecessors. 70 Arguably, national
security is a higher state interest. Still others who believe a prosecution
could succeed argue more from first principles. Judge Posner asserts that,
"[a]s a matter of constitutional law, the government should be allowed
to ... punish the knowing publication or other dissemination of classified
material concerning national security, provided that the material was
164 Id. at 637 ("[D]efendants here contend that the First Amendment bars Congress from
punishing those persons, like defendants, without a special relationship to the government for the
disclosure of [National Defense Information]. In essence, their position is that once a government
secret has been leaked to the general public and the first line of defense thereby breached, the
government has no recourse but to sit back and watch as the threat to the national security caused
by the first disclosure multiplies with every subsequent disclosure."); see also Reply Brief in
Support of Defendants Steven J. Rosen's and Keither Weissman's Motion to Dismiss the
Superseding Indictment at 1S, United States v. Rosen, No. 05-0225 (E.D. Va. Feb. 6, 2006).

165 Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 637.
166 Bellia, supra note 135, at 15o8.
167 Id. at 1494.

168 Justice Breyer's concurrence, which Justice O'Connor joined, narrows the holding.
Bartnickiv. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2oo1) (Breyer, J., concurring).
169 Bellia, supra note 135, at 1494.

170 Id. at 15o8; Rodney A. Smolla, Information as Contraband: The First Amendment and
Liabilityfor Trafficking in Speech, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. o99, 1169-70 (2002).
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classified in accordance with proper statutory criteria (which do not yet
exist).' 171 Kenneth Wainstein, who served in Homeland Security posts
under President George W. Bush, told Congress in 2010 that an Espionage
Act prosecution against WikiLeaks could survive a constitutional
challenge. 72 As he saw it, the key was to distinguish WikiLeaks from the
mainstream media, and thus "hopefully lower any First Amendment
obstacles."'73 In the same 2010 hearings, Gabriel Schoenfeld emphasized that
the First Amendment was originally conceived as a prohibition on prior
restraints and censorship, "[b]ut laws punishing the publication of certain
kinds of material after the fact were something else again.' 174 He quoted
Joseph Story's assertion that it was an absurdity "too wild to be indulged by
any rational man" to believe that the First Amendment allowed "every
citizen an absolute right to speak, or write, or print, whatever he might
please."1 75 Schoenfeld argued that prosecutorial discretion and the jury
system were checks on punishing the publication of classified information:
[Ihf newspaper[] editors or an organization like WikiLeaks disclose[s] a
secret vital to our national security-and have no justification for doing so
beyond a desire to expose for exposure's sake-they should also be prepared
76
to face the judgment of a jury. . . and the full wrath of the law.'

3. What to Make of the Debate
Regardless of which side is right, it is hard to dispute that the tenor of
the debate has changed. A generation ago, one could be confident that the
press would not be prosecuted. Now, such a prosecution is cause for
concern, even for those who think the First Amendment would ultimately
prevail. A recent incident involving a Fox News reporter hints at how close
the media may be to facing criminal charges. In that case, reporter James
Rosen built a relationship with a State Department official who leaked to
Rosen classified information about North Korea. The leaker was
criminally prosecuted, but surprisingly, the FBI deemed Rosen an

171 RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF
NATIONAL EMERGENCY no (2o06).
172 WikiLeaks Hearing,supra note 153, at 43.
173 Id. at 45; see also Stephen I. Vladeck, Inchoate Liability and the Espionage Act: The Statutory
Framework and the Freedom of the Press, i HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 219, 224 (2007).
174 WikiLeaks Hearing,supra note 153, at 6o.

175Id.
176 Id. at 65.
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unindicted co-conspirator. In an application for a warrant to search Rosen's
email, the FBI said that Rosen was "at the very least ... an aider, abettor
and/or co-conspirator" in the leak.7 Although Rosen was not prosecuted,
the warrant application suggests that at least one arm of the executive
branch thought downstream publishers could be prosecuted. The impending
case against WikiLeaks' founder, Julian Assange, is another sign that the
rules on punishing downstream publishers are changing.1 78 It remains to be
seen whether and how the Espionage Act will be applied to this most
famous of leak recipients, but the prospect of prosecution certainly seems
79
real despite the protections of the First Amendment.
B. Retroactively Classified Documents
That recipients of classified documents could be prosecuted for
republishing them raises the question: How would the analysis differ if the
documents were retroactively classified? This Section shows that any
prosecution based on retroactively classified documents would face serious
hurdles, above and beyond those faced by prosecutions based on
traditionally classified material. Indeed, retroactive classification challenges
many of the Espionage Act's basic assumptions. Despite these challenges,
this Section argues that a prosecution could succeed. In the right
circumstances, a person could be convicted for publishing information that
was declassified when she received it but retroactively classified later on.
I. Are the Threats of Prosecution Real?

It is tempting to say there is no threat of prosecution arising from
retroactively classified documents, much less the possibility of sustaining a
177 Application for a Search Warrant at 27, In re Search of [Redacted], No. 10-0291 (D.D.C.
Nov. 7, 2011), available at http://www.fas.orglsgpljud/kimlwarrant.pdf;see also id. at 3, 29, 36; Ann
E. Marimow, A Rare Peek into a Justice Department Leak Probe, WASH. POST (May 19, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ ocal/a-rare-peek-into-a-justice-department-leak-probe/2013/05/
19/obc473de-be5e-i1e2-97d4-a479289a3if9_print.html.
178 A grand jury has reportedly convened to investigate Assange, and many influential voices
have called for his prosecution. Lindenberger, supra note 154; see also Dianne Feinstein, Op-Ed,
Prosecute Assange Under the EspionageAct, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 2010, at A1 9 (asserting the existence
of "ample statutory authority for prosecuting individuals who elicit or disseminate the types of
documents at issue" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
179 Of course, he could be charged under a different Espionage Act provision or a different
statute altogether. JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R414 o 4 , CRIMINAL
PROHIBITIONS ON THE PUBLICATION OF CLASSIFIED DEFENSE INFORMATION 13-15 (2013),

available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R4'o4.pdf. See generally James Freedman, Note,
Protecting State Secrets as Intellectual Property:A Strategy for Prosecuting WikiLeaks, 48 STAN. J. INT'L
L. 18S (2012).
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conviction. After all, former directors of the Information Security Oversight
Office (ISOO) emphasize that no one would be prosecuted for anything
related to retroactively classified documents. Bill Leonard, the agency's
director under President George W. Bush, said that, "if through the actions
of the government, somebody came into possession- legitimate
possession-of the material, and the government then subsequently
[classified it], those individuals wouldn't find themselves in jeopardy,"
80
though he acknowledged that prosecution could, "in theory," occur.
William J. Bosanko, who succeeded Leonard, also emphasized that no one
would be prosecuted."'
But those who have experienced retroactive classification report that
threats abound. James Bamford received repeated threats from the Justice
Department when he refused to give back retroactively classified
documents.1 1 2 Attorney Mark Zaid recounts that the CIA threatened to
revoke his security clearance and to prosecute his co-counsel (who did not
have a security clearance) if they did not give back documents that had been
retroactively classified.18 3 Janine Brookner, a CIA-operative-turned-lawyer,
reported similar threats in an interview with the Washington Post. She said
the CIA sometimes "declassifies documents, only to reclassify them years
later and demand that a plaintiff's lawyers give them back or be
prosecuted."18 4 And researcher Matthew Aid, who is in possession of
hundreds of retroactively classified documents copied from the National
Archives, said the threat of prosecution hangs over him like "the Sword of
Damocles."' Still, none of these people has been prosecuted, which raises
the question of whether the threats amount to anything real. "Is it a real
threat?" Zaid asked. "Who knows? The problem is that nobody wants to be
the one to risk it. ' 186 From a First Amendment standpoint, the mere threat
of prosecution is significant because it has a chilling effect on protected

180 Telephone Interview with Bill Leonard, supra note 112.
181 In answering questions about retroactive classification, William J. Bosanko, former
director of ISOO, often senses "there is anxiety about, is somebody going to get locked up."
Telephone Interview with William J. Bosanko, supra note 56. "Do you know somebody who is
facing that?" he asked. Id.
182 Telephone Interview with James Bamford, Journalist (Nov. 6, 2013) (notes on file with
author).
183 Telephone Interview with Mark Zaid, supra note 125.
184 Peter Carlson, Counter Intelligence: Looking to Sue the CIA? First Find Janine Brookner,
WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2004, at Ci.

185 Telephone Interview with Matthew Aid, supra note 53.
186 Telephone Interview with Mark Zaid, supra note 125.
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speech, even if the threat has yet to be carried out. 87 Thus, the threat of
prosecution cannot be dismissed so easily.
2.

Source/Distributor Divide

With traditional leaks, the prosecutor's first task is often to separate the
source from the distributor. As discussed above, prosecutors usually target
the source and not the distributor (or the recipient).188 Retroactive
classification complicates even this simple dichotomy, however, by blurring
the line between source and distributor. If I receive a document in response
to a FOIA request and that document is retroactively classified the next day,
what would I be considered if I proceed to publish the information? On the
one hand, I might seem like a distributor because I passively received the
document from the FOIA officer and then republished it. On the other
hand, I could be considered a source because I am the one breaking the duty
imposed by retroactive classification-the "obligation not to disclose the
information."'1 9 I am the insider illicitly parting the curtain of secrecy.
While the more likely interpretation is that I am the distributor, not the
source, this definitional difficulty is one manifestation of the trouble that
retroactive classification would pose for an Espionage Act prosecution.
3. Espionage Act
A prosecution based on retroactively classified material would also
encounter problems satisfying the elements of the Espionage Actproblems beyond those discussed in the context of traditionally classified
documents. 9 ' The most significant of these problems is that the Act covers
only material that is "closely held" or secret. While the text of the
Espionage Act does not mention classification status, the Supreme Court
has interpreted the Act's reference to "information relating to the national
defense" as a requirement that the information be secret. 191 "Where there is
no occasion for secrecy, as with reports relating to national defense, published
by authority of Congress or the military departments," the Court explained,

187 The First Amendment is concerned with the chilling of speech. That is why, for example,
litigants can sue on overbreadth grounds. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)
("The threat of sanctions may deter ... almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions"
(internal quotation marks omitted)); cf Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 5-7,
Project on Gov't Oversight v. Ashcroft, No. 04-1032 (D.D.C. June 23, 2004).

188 See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
189 32 C.F.R. § 2001.13(b)(3) (2010).
190 See supra notes 136-144 and accompanying text.
191 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) (2012).
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"there can, of course, in all likelihood be no reasonable intent to give an
advantage to a foreign government."19' 2 In this passage, we see the Court
construct a dichotomy between information for which there is an "occasion
for secrecy" and information "published by authority" of the government.
The former can be the basis for an Espionage Act prosecution, while the
latter cannot. But the distinction falls apart when applied to retroactively
classified documents because they are published by the government and
considered to be secret. The courts would have to decide which of these
conflicting statuses-public or secret-prevails.
A leading case from the Second Circuit emphasizes the problem. In
United States v. Heine, the defendant reported to the Third Reich about
America's industrial capacity, but his report was based entirely on public
information. 93 The Second Circuit explained that the defendant's
"information came from sources that were lawfully accessible to anyone who
was willing to take the pains to find, sift and collate it."'1 94 In reversing the

defendant's Espionage Act conviction, the Second Circuit held that it was
"obviously lawful to transmit any information ... which the services had
themselves made public" as well as any "information which the services
have never thought it necessary to withhold." 195 The court said it would
defer to the government's judgment about what information should be
considered secret, and if the government made the information public, that
would indicate the information was not sensitive. 96 But retroactive
classification again raises a difficult problem for this dichotomy between
public and secret, because retroactively classified documents were both
"made public" and "thought ...necessary to withhold." 97 In reviewing an
Espionage Act prosecution, a court would have to decide whether the initial
public release made the document conclusively public or whether that
public status could be reversed by the retroactive classification.
Finally, in 2000, the Fourth Circuit addressed a similar question in United
States v. Squillacote. 98 The defendant, an East German-turned-Russian spy,
challenged her conviction on the grounds that the information she
transmitted was "available to the public" and thus "can never be considered

192 Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 28 (1941) (emphasis added).
193 i1 F.2d 813, 815 (2d Cir. 1945).
194

Id.

195 Id. at 8M6.
196 See id. ("The services must be trusted to determine what information may be broadcast

without prejudice to the 'national defense."')
197Id.
198 221 F.3 d 542, 575 ( 4 th Cir. 2000).
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national defense information."'9 9 In Squillacote, the information in the
contested documents was available from a combination of public sources,
but it had never been officially confirmed by the government. 20 0 Was this
information public for purposes of the Espionage Act? The Fourth Circuit
articulated the following test: regardless of what "unofficial," "unreliable"
information may be in the public domain, "a document containing official
government information relating to the national defense will not be
considered available to the public (and therefore no longer national defense
information) until the official information in that document is lawfully
available."201 In short, the court held that leaks and speculation do not
remove information from the protection of the Espionage Act; only
government releases can do that. But this raises a now-familiar problem
when applied to retroactively classified documents because those documents
used to be "lawfully available" but no longer are. Again, a court would have
to decide whether to privilege the present secret status over the former
public one.
4. First Amendment
The key analytical difference between prosecutions based on classified
documents and those based on retroactively classified documents lies in how
the First Amendment would apply in each case. With prosecutions based on
traditionally classified documents, commentators rely on Bartnicki for the
claim that the First Amendment would quash a prosecution. 20 2 But, as
discussed above, Bartnicki's relevance has been contested because it applies
only to instances where the receipt of information is lawful, whereas the
Espionage Act criminalizes the receipt of classified documents. 20 3 In the
context of retroactive classification, however, Bartnicki and several of its
predecessors are even less applicable as they pertain to information that the
media acquired on its own, whereas retroactive classification concerns
20 4
information that the government itself disclosed.

199 Id.
200 Id. at 576-78.
201 Id. at 578 (emphasis added).
202 Stone, supra note 133, at 211; supra notes 145-152 and accompany text.
203 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 532 (2ool); see also id. at 540 (Breyer, J., concurring)
(pointing to "lawful nature" of the media's behavior in the case); ELSEA, supra note 179, at 27;
POSNER, supra note 171, at io8; Benkler, supra note 151,at 364; supra notes 166-169 and
accompanying text.
204 Like Bartnicki, Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978), and Smith
v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979), are not relevant in this respect because they
concern information that was not disclosed by the government.
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The significance of the government's self-disclosure of information
cannot be overstated. Instead of applying Bartnicki, the courts reviewing a
retroactive classification prosecution would look to Bartnicki's predecessors
that dealt with information disclosed by the government. Those cases,
described below, wrestle with whether the government may punish those
who publish information that the government has itself disclosed. These
cases collectively articulate a disclosure principle: Once the government
discloses information to the public, it cannot punish someone for
republishing it except in the most extreme circumstances.
The first of the cases to articulate the disclosure principle is Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn.205 In Cox Broadcasting, a Georgia law made it a
misdemeanor to publish the name of a rape victim.

20 6

In the trial of the

accused rapists, a reporter learned the victim's name from the indictment
and revealed it on television, leading the victim's father to sue for invasion
of privacy. 207 The privacy suit relied on the law against publicizing a rape
victim's name, but the U.S. Supreme Court held that the law violated the
First Amendment: "Once true information is disclosed in public court
documents open to public inspection, the press cannot be sanctioned for
208
publishing it."
The Court soon extended the disclosure principle to judicial gag orders
in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart.20 9 In that case, a state judge barred
journalists from publishing "accounts of confessions or admission[s]" made
by the defendant in a high-profile murder prosecution. 210 The judge insisted
on this prohibition even though the information had been disclosed in court
proceedings attended by the public.211 However, on appeal, the Supreme
Court held the gag order unconstitutional because it "prohibited the
reporting of evidence adduced at the open preliminary hearing."212 As the
Court explained, "[t]here is nothing that proscribes the press from
213
reporting events that transpire in the courtroom."
The Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in Oklahoma Publishing
Co. v. District Court, where a judge prohibited the press from publishing
information about a juvenile defendant, even though the information was
205 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
206 Id. at 471-73.

207 Id. at 473-74. The victim herself could not sue because she died as a result of the attack.
208 Id. at 496.
209 Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559-62 (1976).
210 Id. at 541-42.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 568.

213 Id. (citations omitted).
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discussed in open court.21 4 In that case, Oklahoma law imposed
confidentiality on juvenile proceedings and records unless a judge
specifically authorized their publication. Again, the Supreme Court held
that the gag order violated the First Amendment because the "widely
disseminated information [had been] obtained at court proceedings which
were in fact open to the public."2"$ In short, once the court system disclosed
the information to the public, it could not be recalled.
The most extreme manifestation of the disclosure principle, however,
can be seen in Florida Star v. B.JF., a case involving Florida's prohibition on
publishing the names of rape victims. 2 16 In that case, the sheriff's office

maintained a media room where it placed press releases and crime reports.
The authorities were supposed to redact the names of rape victims from
these documents but on this occasion, the sheriff's office failed to do so. 217 A
"reporter-trainee" working for the Florida Star newspaper copied the entire
report of B.J.F.'s rape and gave it to one of the paper's reporters, who in
turn included the victim's name in a short write-up of the crime. 218 The rape
victim sued, citing the state law that prohibited publication of a rape
victim's name. 219 When the Supreme Court received the case, however, it
held that the newspaper was protected by the First Amendment because,
"where the government has made certain information publicly available, it is
highly anomalous to sanction persons other than the source of its release." 220
It continued: "The government's issuance of such a release, without
qualification, can only convey to recipients that the government considered
dissemination lawful, and indeed expected the recipients to disseminate the
221
informationfurther.
What makes Florida Star's articulation of the disclosure principle so
extreme is that the facts of the case so clearly indicate the information was
never intended for public disclosure. The authorities intended to redact the
victim's name, the Florida Star's reporter-trainee was the only one to pick up
and read the unredacted report, a sign in the media room where the press
releases and crime reports were kept warned of the state prohibition against
214
215
216
217

Okla. Publ'g Co. v. Dist. Court, 430 U.S. 3o8, 309-10 (1977).
Id. at 310.
Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 526 (1989).
Id.at 526-28.

218 Id.
219 Id. at 528.
220 Id. at 535, 540-41.

221 Id. at 538-39 (emphasis added); see also Boettger v. Loverro, 587 A.2d 712, 718 (Pa. 1991)
("[W]hen the assistant district attorney filed a copy of the transcript with the Clerk of Courts ...
it went in the public domain, irrespective of whether or not the action of the assistant district
attorney was inadvertent.").
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publishing a rape victim's name, and the reporter was aware of this
prohibition. 222 Despite these facts, the Supreme Court characterized the
release as an official disclosure sufficient to demonstrate that the
government believed that "dissemination [was] lawful, and indeed expected
the recipients to disseminate the information further."223 Disclosure was
disclosure, and the Court held that the full protection of the First
Amendment applied. To conclude otherwise, the Court explained, would be
to impose on the media "the onerous obligation of sifting through
government press releases, reports, and pronouncements to prune out
material arguably unlawful for publication, '224 which would invite the ill of
225
"overdeterrence."
The implications of the disclosure principle for retroactive classification
are significant. If even the limited, accidental release in Florida Star counts
as government disclosure, then so must the examples of retroactive
classification discussed in this Article. A FOIA response sent to just a single
person, a document the government published online or entered into the
congressional record-each of these would trigger the full protections of the
First Amendment. And, under these precedents, an Espionage Act
prosecution based on retroactive classification would face strict scrutiny.
This is not to say that an Espionage Act prosecution would necessarily
fail strict scrutiny. Depending on the circumstances of the case, the
government could demonstrate a compelling state interest and narrow
tailoring in enforcing retroactive classification. But the government would
face two obstacles. First, it would have to explain how a document
important enough to create a compelling state interest could have been
disclosed in the first place. 226 Second, the government would have to show

how prosecuting someone after publication would do any good in keeping
the document secret, much less qualify as the least restrictive method of
preserving the document's confidentiality. After all, as Cox Broadcasting,
Nebraska Press, Oklahoma Publishing, and Florida Star show, the government
always has a less restrictive method for protecting a document's
confidentiality: it can be more careful at the outset about what information
it releases.

222 Oral Argument at 5:28, 29:28, Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (No. 87-0329),
availableat http://www.oyez.org/cases/198o-1989/988/1988-87-329.
223 Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 538-39.
224 Id. at 536.
225 Id. at 535.
226 This could perhaps be accomplished by showing that the document was not important at
the time that it was disclosed, but has since become so.
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The above analysis shows that a prosecution based on the disclosure of
retroactively classified documents would face hurdles even higher than a
prosecution involving traditionally classified documents. Those statutory
and constitutional challenges might appear to eliminate the threat of the
Espionage Act being used to enforce retroactive classification. But the case
against such a retroactive-classification prosecution is not as open-and-shut
as the above analysis suggests. Part III explains why.
III. RETROACTIVE CLASSIFICATION IN
OTHER AREAS OF THE LAW

Despite daunting statutory and First Amendment hurdles, an Espionage
Act conviction is not as far-fetched as it may appear. Lower courts have
struggled with their own versions of retroactive classification in a wide
range of substantive legal areas. Part III examines such cases and argues
that, in light of the courts' struggles in resolving them, retroactive
classification may well have teeth after all. This Part also situates retroactive
classification in a larger debate about the government's ability to control
information it has placed in the public record-a debate that asks whether
someone can be punished for publishing information that the government
has itself disclosed. Scholars tend to assume that the government cannot
control information that it has placed in the public record, but this Part
challenges that assumption. 27
At first blush, retroactive classification seems sui generis and absurd.
Indeed, many doctrines would scoff at the claim that information, once
revealed, could be treated as secret. In trade secret law, for example, once
information is disclosed to the public-even inadvertently-it no longer
receives trade secret protection. 228 The Fourth Amendment is just as
227 See Edward Lee, The Public's Domain: The Evolution of Legal Restraints on the Government's
Power to Control Public Access Through Secrecy or Intellectual Property, S5HASTINGS L.J. 91, 209
(2003) (stating that "[w]hatever lies in the public's domain belongs, by definition, to the people
and is, therefore, off-limits to government control," but also noting recent challenges to this view);
id. at 136-37 ("[T]he function of the public domain ... is to act as a restraint on government
power."); Smolla, supra note 170, at 1168-69 ("[The government] may not adopt the simple
expedient of penalizing the press for using the material given to it .... If the journalist is handed
information, the journalist may examine it and publish it."); Daniel J. Solove, Access and
Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1204 (2002)
("[G]overnments cannot establish post-access restrictions on the disclosure or use of information
that is publicly available. Once the information is made available to the public, the Florida Star
case prohibits a state from restricting use."). See generally Mart, supra note 9.
228 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984) ("If an individual discloses
his trade secret to others who are under no obligation to protect the confidentiality of the
information ... his property right is extinguished." (citations omitted)).
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demanding, holding that once a person discloses information to a third
party he has "no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he
voluntarily turns over. '229 The law concerning testimonial privileges takes
the same approach. The marital and attorney-client privileges, for example,
2a0
are destroyed when secret information is disclosed to a third party.
Scratch a little deeper, however, and analogies to retroactive
classification abound. Retroactive classification of sorts has been used to
protect atomic secrets, Social Security numbers, police officers' home
addresses, rape victims' names-even after Florida Star-and tax return
information, to name just a few examples. 231 In these cases, the courts have
grappled with whether the government may disclose sensitive information
in the public record and then punish those who republish the
information. 232 Despite the strident language of Bartnicki and Florida Star,
this turns out to be a surprisingly difficult question that some courts have
answered in the affirmative and others in the negative. The cases discussed
below suggest that, confronted with a prosecution based on retroactive
classification, a court may well allow the prosecution to go forward.
A. "Born Classified"and the Atomic Bomb
The "born classified" doctrine holds that information related to nuclear
weapons can be classified even if the government previously disclosed the
information or the information originated from private sources. The
standard-bearer for this doctrine is United States v. Progressive,233 a case
dealing with a magazine article that described how to build an atomic
229 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979).
230 See Cal. Evid. Code § 912 (2014); John T. Hundley, Annotation, Waiver of Evidentiary
Privilege by Inadvertent Disclosure-StateLaw, 51 A.L.R. 5 th 603, 636-38 (1997).
231 Commercial speech is not the focus of this Article, but it is worth noting that some states
have attempted to limit uses of public records. Despite commercial speech's diminished First
Amendment protections, these statutes have often not fared well under judicial review. See, e.g.,
R.I. Ass'n of Realtors, Inc. v. Whitehouse, 199 F.3 d 26, 28 (1st Cir. 1999) (affirming district court's
decision to strike down Rhode Island statute prohibiting "information obtained from public
records" from being used "to solicit for commercial purposes"); Pellegrino v. Satz, No. 98-7356,
1998 WL 1668786 at "s(S.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 1998) (striking down Florida statute that prevented use
of police reports "for any commercial solicitation of the victims"). But cf. L.A. Police Dep't v.
United Reporting Publ'g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 34-35, 40 (1999). See generally Solove, supra note 227,
at 1169-70 (giving a brief overview of some commercial use restrictions).
232 See Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1127 (2005)
(touching on several of these prohibitions in addressing whether the First Amendment protects
crime-facilitating speech, but not addressing the public-record aspect of these cases); see also
Smolla, supra note 170, at 116o (discussing the courts' treatment of information obtained by the
press inopen court proceedings).
233 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
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bomb.23 4 In 1979, the Justice Department sought an injunction to prevent
the publication of this controversial article. 235 The magazine insisted that all
of the information in the article was "already in the public domain and
readily available to any diligent seeker," so it should not be restrained from
3 6 The government countered that, even if all the information
publication23
were already public-a fact that the government disputed-the synthesis of
this information should still be classifiable under the Atomic Energy Act
because it threatened "immediate, direct and irreparable harm to the
interests of the United States."237 With great trepidation, the district judge
attempted to balance the "honored" values of the First Amendment against
a risk of "sufficient destructive potential to ...endanger the right to life
itself."238 In the end, the judge issued the injunction against publication,
though he assured the parties that the case would "undoubtedly go to the
239
Supreme Court."
United States v. Progressive has come to stand for the lengths to which the
government may go in controlling information in the public domain. While
scholarly accounts of the case have focused on the injunction order
discussed above, the court's little-discussed ruling on a motion to reconsider
is more relevant to retroactive classification. 240 Unlike the injunction order,
the ruling on the motion to reconsider discussed documents that were
actually retroactively classified. According to the court, two documents
containing technical information about nuclear weaponry were errantly
declassified by the government and placed in the public section of the Los
Alamos Scientific Library, where they remained for years. 241 Under Florida
Star's disclosure principle, the government's inadvertent disclosure of these
documents would have placed them irretrievably in the public record. 242 But
the district court concluded the opposite: "[F]rom a legal point of view, the
government's error in inadvertently declassifying [the documents] did not

234 See Howard Morland, The H-Bomb Secret: Ho

We Got It-Why We're Telling It,

PROGRESSIVE, Nov. 1979, at 3.

235 Walter Pincus, Article on H-Bomb Went to Officials 3 Times Before US. Acted, WASH. POST,
Mar. 11, 1979, at Ai.

236 Progressive, 467 F. Supp. at 993.
237 Id. at 991, 993; see also 42 U.S.C. §2014(y) (2012) (defining the scope of the "Restricted
Data" covered by the Atomic Energy Act).
238 Progressive, 467 F. Supp. at 992, 995. Hours before granting the injunction, the judge
instructed the parties to consider mediation one last time. Id. at 997.
239 Id. at 996.

240 United States v. Progressive, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 5 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
241 Id. at 7.
242 See supra notes 216-22o and accompanying text.
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move these documents into the public domain. '243 The Progressive case thus
provides an example of a court's endorsing retroactive classification. And if
retroactive classification could support a prior restraint, as it did in this case,
that is all the more reason to believe it could support a post-publication
244
prosecution, which is generally thought to be easier to obtain.
But whatever lessons about retroactive classification can be drawn from
Progressive are necessarily tentative because the case became moot before the
court of appeals or the Supreme Court could decide it. While the
magazine's appeal was pending before the Seventh Circuit, another
publication printed the most sensitive information in the contested
article. 245 Once that information was printed, the Justice Department asked

for the injunction to be rescinded. 246 The Progressive case may thus
undermine the theory behind retroactive classification because, as soon as
the information was publicly available, the government ceased trying to
keep it secret.
Drawing a lesson from this case is further complicated by the fact that
the nuclear bomb is an extreme example. The district judge was convinced
that an error in favor of the First Amendment could mean the end of all life
on earth. 247 Reading the opinion, one senses that practically any doctrine,
no matter how protective of speech, would have given way before the court's
fear of atomic incineration.
Thus, when considering retroactive classification's viability, it might be
better to consider analogies to less extreme doctrines and circumstances,
including those dealing with "important" interests, "compelling" interests,
and even "interests of the highest order," but not interests as pressing as the
ones posed by a potential nuclear Armageddon. As it turns out, there are
quite a few such analogies.

243 Progressive, 486 F. Supp. at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted).

244 See, e.g., Michael Coenen, Of Speech and Sanctions: Toward a Penalty-Sensitive Approach to
the First Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 991, 1017 (2012); Heidi Kitrosser, Classified Information
Leaks and Free Speech, 2o08 U. ILL. L. REV. 881, 899 (2o08). The Invention Secrecy Act provides
another example of a statute that allows information, once public, to become secret. The Act
allows the government to make a patent application secret "[i]f... the publication or disclosure of
the invention by the publication of an application ... would be detrimental to the national
security." 35 U.S.C. § 181. If the applicant reveals the information anyway, he can face criminal
charges. Id. §§ 182, 186.
245 Charles R. Babcock, US. EndingSuit Against Magazine, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 1979, at Ai.
246 Id.
247 See United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 99 o , 996 (WD. Wis. 1979).
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B. Social Security Numbers
The best analogy to retroactive classification may come from Ostergren v.
Cuccinelli, a case involving the republication of Social Security numbers that
were revealed in public records. 248 In the 199os, officials in Virginia and
other states began providing online access to property and other official
records. 249 However, the move online came with a cost: many of the records
contained Social Security numbers, which could be used to facilitate
identity theft.2 5 0 In Virginia alone, the local clerks of court posted 200
million records online, an estimated three percent of which contained Social
251
Security numbers.
Privacy advocate Betty Ostergren began lobbying elected officials in
Virginia and other affected states to remove the records from the Internet
until the Social Security numbers could be redacted. 2 2 When state and local
officials in Virginia refused to take the records down, Ostergren took a
different approach. She tracked down public records revealing elected
23
officials' Social Security numbers and posted the records on her website.
The Virginia legislature did not look favorably on this campaign and in
2008, amended its privacy statute to make Ostergren's actions illegal. 25 4 The
state attorney general announced that if Ostergren persisted, she would be
prosecuted. 255 The threat prompted Ostergren to request that the law be
25 6
enjoined on First Amendment grounds.
The case raises questions similar to those raised by retroactive
classification. As in retroactive classification, the government in Ostergren's
case disclosed sensitive information to the public and then sought to
prevent its further dissemination by prohibiting republication. 25 7 The
statute prohibiting publication of the Social Security numbers imposed an
obligation of confidentiality on members of the public just as retroactive
248 61s F. 3d 263 ( 4 th Cir. 2010).
249 Id. at 266-67.

250 Id. at 267.
251 Id. at 267, 285.
252 Id. at 268.

253 Id. The website still displays the Social Security numbers of Jeb Bush, Porter Goss, Tom Delay,
and many other officials inside and outside of Virginia. See Examples of "Public" Records ith
SSNs... Including Legislators' and Clerks of Circuit Courts, VA. WATCHDOG, http://www.opcva.com/
watchdog/RECORDS.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2015), archivedat http://www.perma.cc/S45R-GT2K.
254 VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1- 4 43.2(A)(i) (2014); Ostergren, 615 F. 3 d at 266, 269.
255 Ostergren, 61S F. 3 d at 269.

256 Id. At least one person has been convicted for using Ostergren's website to commit
identity theft. Id.
257 While the government did not author these records, it did disclose the Social Security
numbers by making the unredacted records available.
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classification does in the national security context. And, as with retroactive
classification, the ban on republishing the Social Security numbers went
into effect even though the information remained easily accessible in the
public domain.
When Ostergren's case made it to the Fourth Circuit, the court held that
Virginia's Social Security number statute was unconstitutional. 258 The
court's reasoning is significant because it both supports and undermines the
rationales underlying retroactive classification. Virginia argued that
publishing Social Security numbers was not protected speech and, in the
alternative, that "the state interest in preserving citizens' privacy ...
justifie[s] barring Ostergren's speech." 25 9 Ostergren invoked Daily Mail
Publishing, Florida Star, and Bartnicki, among other First Amendment
precedent, in arguing that strict scrutiny should apply. 60 The Fourth
Circuit held that, in some cases, publishing Social Security numbers would
not receive First Amendment protection, but in Ostergren's case, the Social
Security numbers were "integral to her message" about government privacy
261
practices-" [i]ndeed, they are her message."
The court then applied strict scrutiny, asking whether the statute was
"narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order. '262 On the state
interest prong, the Fourth Circuit said that protecting Social Security
numbers "may certainly constitute 'a state interest of the highest order,"'
though it declined to decide whether it constituted one in this case because
it found the statute not narrowly tailored. 263 This dicta is useful for our
purposes because, if protecting Social Security numbers can qualify as a
state interest of the highest order, then protecting the government's top
secrets could certainly qualify as well.
It was the narrow tailoring analysis, however, that proved key to the
Fourth Circuit's decision. Again, this analysis is relevant to our inquiry
because it both supports and undermines the case for retroactive
classification. It supports retroactive classification insofar as the court
rejected Ostergren's claim that once the government disclosed information
to the public, the government was powerless to control the information's
further dissemination. 264 The Fourth Circuit approvingly cited an exchange
from the proceedings below where the district court challenged Ostergren's
258 Ostergren, 615 F. 3 d at 286-87.
259
260
261
262
263
264

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.at
Id.at
Id.at

270.
273-76.
272.
275.
280.
281.
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use of the disclosure principle. 26 In that exchange, the district court asked
what would happen if the federal government accidentally disclosed all
Social Security numbers in the country.266 Ostergren insisted that, under
Cox Broadcasting, the government could not prevent the republication of
those numbers. 267 The court forcefully disagreed:
Are you saying that Congress couldn't come in with a statute and say, you
can't replicate these things? What they would do is try to take the system
that had gone wrong, fix what they can fix, knowing that there are people
who have already gotten into the database that spilled accidentally, but
knowing the damage is somewhat limited and saying we are going to stop it
right here, and the way we're going to stop it is making it unlawful for you,
268
anybody, to take this information that's been accidentally spilled and use it.

The hypothetical remedy the court suggested-barring the reproduction
of the leaked numbers-sounds just like retroactive classification. While
Florida Star and its kin hold that disclosure is disclosure and that disclosed
information cannot be further controlled, the Fourth Circuit seems to
endorse a different view. Indeed, it accepted as a given that the government
could claw back information that it inadvertently released, at least in the
hypothetical concerning Social Security numbers. This clawback of
information is the reason retroactive classification developed: to address
errant declassification and disclosure of classified information. In this
respect, Ostergren supports the idea that retroactive classification is a
legitimate governmental power.
However, there is also much within the opinion that can be seen to
oppose retroactive classification. After all, the Fourth Circuit held that the
statute that allowed this analogue to retroactive classification was not
narrowly tailored enough to be constitutional. 269 The court's central concern
was the constitutionality of forcing Ostergren to respect the confidentiality
of these records "when Virginia currently makes those same records
available . . . without having redacted [Social Security numbers]." 270 The
court put much emphasis on the fact that fifteen counties did not even
finish running the redaction software that had proven largely successful in
265 Id.
266 Id.
267 Id. According to Ostergren, Cox Broadcasting stands for the proposition that "when the

Government makes something available, they are responsible for controlling the dissemination of
information. They can't make someone else do it." Id. at 281 n.14.
268 Id. at 281 n.14.
269 Id. at 285-87.
270 Id. at 286.
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erasing Social Security numbers from the online records. 271 The court also
found that, rather than prosecuting republication, a more narrowly tailored
solution to the privacy problem would be to "direct[] clerks not to make
land records available [online] ... until after [Social Security numbers]
have been redacted. ''272 The Fourth Circuit concluded that, in light of the

state's own lackadaisical approach to fixing the problem, punishing
Ostergren's speech was not the least restrictive alternative-a requirement
2 73
of strict scrutiny.
This narrow tailoring analysis likely previews an argument the defense
would make in a retroactive-classification prosecution. The defendant would
argue that there must be a better way to protect classified data. Indeed, the
defense would emphasize the well-documented sloppiness of the
classification system, a system that "leaks like a sieve"274 and that a Senate
committee recently declared was "not trusted on the inside any more than it
is on the outside." 275 Following Ostergren, a court reviewing a retroactive-

classification prosecution might well conclude that a more narrowly tailored
method for preventing the release of government secrets would be for the
government to take proper care of the secrets in the first place. This narrowtailoring analysis would undermine the viability of a retroactiveclassification prosecution.
In the end, however, while the Fourth Circuit held that Ostergren could

276
If
not be punished, what is significant is how close the decision was.

Virginia had been more diligent in redacting the records, the statute may
well have withstood First Amendment scrutiny.277 And, in a retroactive
classification case, the federal government would be able to show that it had
been more diligent in protecting its secrets than Virginia was in protecting
Social Security numbers. Notwithstanding some high-profile failures in the
classification system, the government's substantial efforts to protect national
security secrets could convince a court that enforcing the retroactive
classification rules is the least restrictive means of protecting government
secrets.

271
272
273

Id.
Id.
Id. at 286-87.

274 See, e.g., Pozen, supra note 134, at 513.

,
275 Preserving American Access to Information Act, S. 146 4 13th

276 Ostergren, 615 F.3 d at 290.
277 Id. at 286-87.

Cong. § 2 (2013).
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C. Police Officer PersonalInformation, Unexecuted
Arrest Warrants, and Rape Victims' Names
Other analogies to retroactive classification can be found in the criminal
justice system, including instances where the government attempts to
restrict the publication of information that it has already disclosed by its
own hand. The Supreme Court cases discussed in Section II.B largely
concern this type of information, such as rape victims' names and juvenile
defendants' identities. However, even after the Supreme Court's
pronouncements about the right to publish such information where it is
lawfully obtained, lower courts continue to wrestle with how much the
government can do to protect information in the public record.
Both Washington and Florida have criminalized the publication of
police officers' phone numbers, home addresses, and other personal
information. 27 In both states, websites critical of the police managed to
279
locate this sensitive information in public records and post it online.
When the websites were threatened with legal action, they brought First
Amendment challenges. The district courts concluded in both cases that
publication of such information, when derived from public records, merited
First Amendment protection. 280 Significantly, in striking down both
statutes, the courts emphasized that the government had been the one
responsible for making this information part of the public record. As the
Washington district court held, "when the government itself injects
personal identifying information into the public domain, it cannot credibly
take the contradictory position that one who compiles and communicates
that information offends a compelling state interest. '281 The Florida district
court employed the same reasoning. 2 2 These police-information cases
follow the contours of Cox Broadcasting and FloridaStar in holding that, once
the government discloses information in a public record, it cannot control
the information's further dissemination. Under this reasoning, a retroactiveclassification prosecution would not survive First Amendment scrutiny.

278 Washington criminalized publication with intent "to harm or intimidate" of an officer's
"residential address, residential telephone number, birthdate, or social security number." WASH.
REV. CODE § 4.24.680 (2002); see also Sheehan v. Gregoire, 272 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1139 (W.D.

Wash. 2003). Florida criminalized malicious publication of an officer's home address or telephone
number. FLA. STAT. § 843.17 (2013); Brayshaw v. Tallahassee, 709 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1247 (N.D. Fla.
2010).

279
280
281
282

Brayshaw, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 1247; Sheehan, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 1139 & n.2, 1142, 1144-45.
See, e.g., Brayshaw, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 1249.
Sheehan, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 1147.
Brayshaw, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 1250.

io84

University of PennsylvaniaLaw Review

[Vol. 163:137

Some state courts adopted the same position in different contexts. In
State v. Stauffer Communications, the Kansas Supreme Court announced a
283
categorical ban on punishing those who publish facts in the public record.
In that case, the First Amendment protection was apparently so strong that
the court did not even perform the strict scrutiny analysis. 28 4 Stauffer
Communications involved a Kansas statute that made it a crime to reveal the
28s
contents of an arrest warrant prior to the warrant's execution.
Nonetheless, the unexecuted warrants were available for public inspection in
the clerk of the court's office. 2 6 A reporter used these unexecuted warrants
to obtain and publish the names of two murder suspects, both of whom fled
the state. 287 The reporter was convicted of violating the statute, but the
Kansas Supreme Court threw out the conviction. 288 Relying in part on Cox
Broadcasting, the court held that the U.S. Constitution and the Kansas Bill
of Rights "forbid the imposition of criminal sanctions for truthful reporting
of facts gleaned from public records. 2' 8 9 The government's disclosure of the
information in a public record thus protected all later disclosures from
punishment.
Even as the Kansas Supreme Court went beyond Cox Broadcasting and
Florida Star in announcing a categorical bar to such prosecutions, the
Colorado Supreme Court went against those cases in upholding a prior
restraint in the rape case against basketball star Kobe Bryant. 290 In People v.
Bryant, a court reporter transcribed the proceedings of an in camera rapeshield hearing and marked the transcript confidential. 291 The reporter then
accidentally sent the transcripts to an email distribution list that included
media organizations, such as the Associated Press, ESPN, and the Denver
Post.292 When the error was detected-and before the news organizations
could publish the information-the trial court issued an injunction barring
293
the media from publishing any information derived from the transcripts.
294
A majority on the Colorado Supreme Court upheld the injunction.

283 592 P.2d 891, 897 (Kan. 1979).
284 Id. at 896.

285 Id. at 893.
286 Id.
287 Id.

288 Id. at 897.
289
290
291
292
293
294

Id. at 894-95.
See People v. Bryant, 94 P.3d 624, 627 (Colo. 2004).
Id. at 627.
Id. at 625-27.
Id. at 626.
Id. at 638.
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This case is relevant to the study of retroactive classification because it
shows the malleability of the line between public and secret. In
distinguishing this case from Florida Star, another case involving an
inadvertent disclosure of information concerning a rape victim, the
Colorado Supreme Court insisted that the information here was still
private, even after the reporters received it. "[I]t is absolutely essential to
2 95
our analysis that these transcripts are still private," the court explained.
Elsewhere, the court stated that the "information has not yet become
public" 296 and, again, that "the contents of the in camera transcribed
proceedings were not publicly available."297
How can a document emailed to reporters at seven news organizations,
themselves members of the public, still be private? On the one hand, it is
clear what the court was trying to say: the information could still be
considered secret, even after the errant mailing, because it had not been
disclosed to a mass audience-the prior restraint had kicked in before the
media organizations could publish the information. On the other hand, this
definition of private seems rather strained. The transcripts were in the
hands of journalists, who were themselves members of the public and who
represented an audience of many millions more. Arguably, disclosing the
documents to those reporters meant that the information was no longer
secret.
Clearly, though, the Colorado Supreme Court did not agree. Its
reasoning rejects the all-or-nothing approach to public disclosure. The
Bryant court asserted that a document disclosed to members of the public
could still be considered private if the members of the public who possessed
the document-in this case, the media-can be intimidated out of further
disseminating the information.2 98 This is the same logic relied upon by
retroactive classification: information, once disclosed to the public, can be
made secret again simply by threatening those in possession of it with
prosecution if they disclose it further. The fact that the Colorado Supreme
Court embraced this reasoning lends support to the idea that other courts
might be willing to do the same in the context of retroactive classification,
especially when the sensitive information concerns a matter of national
security.

295 Id. at 636.
296 Id. at 635 n.io.
297 Id. at 635.
298 Id. at 638.
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D. Tax Return Information
The Internal Revenue Code provides another analogy supporting
retroactive classification. The tax code makes it a felony for anyone "to
whom any return or return information ... is disclosed ...to print or
publish in any manner not provided by law any such return or return
information." 299 There are numerous cases involving Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) agents who leak information to reporters,300 but our
retroactive-classification inquiry is not concerned with such leaks. Instead,
the analogy to retroactive classification arises in cases where the government
discloses tax return information through official channels, either in court or
in response to a FOIA request, and that disclosure then becomes the basis
for further disclosures. In these cases, courts must grapple with whether the
re-publication of tax return information contained in the public record can
still be prosecuted.
In the first scenario, the circuits are split on whether an IRS agent can
be punished for disseminating tax return information after that information
has been documented in public court records. The Tenth Circuit held that
such actions by an IRS agent can be punished, noting that "the fact that [the
agent] had given prior 'incourt' testimony ...which likely removed [the
pieces of information] from their otherwise 'confidential' cloak" does not
insulate the agent from liability if he later on discloses that information.30,
The Ninth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion, holding that, "[o]nce
tax return information is made a part of the public domain, the taxpayer
may no longer claim a right of privacy in that information. '302 The Seventh
Circuit took yet another approach, holding that the court must look to the
"immediate source" of the information to determine if there is a right to
privacy.303 Under this approach, if the "immediate source is a public
document lawfully prepared by an agency that is separate from the Internal
Revenue Service and has lawful access to tax returns"-a document such as
a tax court opinion-then the agent cannot be punished for republishing
30 4
such information.

I.R.C. § 7213(a)(3) (2012).
300 See, e.g., In re Seper, 705 F.2d 1499, 15oo, 1502 ( 9 th Cir. 1983); Erhard v. United States,
299

No. 93-0725, 1994 WL 196755, at"1(D.D.C. Mar. 29, 1994).
301 Rodgers v. Hyatt, 697 F.2d 899, 906 (loth Cir. 1983). In his defense, the IRS agent
argued that "there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy to matters which are of public
record." Id. at 902.
302 Lampert v. United States, 854 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1988).
303 Thomas v. United States, 890 F.2d 18,
21 ( 7th Cir. 1989).
304 Id.
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The question raised by these cases is the one at the core of retroactive
classification: Can the government restrict the dissemination of information
that it has placed in a public record? In answering yes, the Tenth Circuit
lends support to retroactive classification by holding that, even if the
information is available to the public, the IRS officer can still be punished
for republishing it. In answering no, the Ninth Circuit opposes retroactive
classification by holding that the tax information cannot be controlled once
it is in the public record. And the Seventh Circuit, in looking to the
"immediate source," only complicates the issue by requiring courts to judge
whether the immediate source is a public document or a confidential one.
The trouble is that a retroactively classified document is both public and
confidential. The fact that the courts are divided on this question makes the
challenges
to a retroactive-classification
prosecution seem less
insurmountable.
Arguably, a tighter analogy to retroactive classification exists in the
second scenario, where tax information is accidentally disclosed in response
to a FOIA request. The question in this scenario is whether the recipient of
this tax information can be prosecuted for republishing it. This question
arose in 2012 when the IRS responded to a FOIA request by producing
confidential tax documents belonging to several conservative groups that
had applied for tax-exempt status. 305 When ProPublica, the news
organization that made the FOIA request, asked the IRS why it had
30 6
released these documents, the IRS admitted there had been a mistake.
The IRS then threatened to prosecute ProPublica under section 7213(a)(3)
of the Internal Revenue Code if the reporters published the tax
information. 30 7 ProPublica published the information nonetheless, and no
prosecution ensued. But this episode shows yet another instance in which
the government has invoked a version of retroactive classification. Even
though the IRS had disclosed the information through official FOIA
channels, the agency apparently felt legally entitled to threaten prosecution
for republication.

305 Kim Barker & Justin Elliott, IRS Office That Targeted Tea Party Also Disclosed Confidential
Docs From Conservative Groups, PROPUBLICA (May 13, 2013), http://www.propublica.org/article/irsoffice-that-targeted-tea-party-also-disclosed-confidential-docs, archived at http://perma.cc/XM72N66K.
306 Id.

307 Id.; see Email from Kim Barker, Reporter, ProPublica, to author (Jan. 7, 2014, 3:11 PM)
(on file with author).
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E. Court Records and Transcripts
The judiciary also employs a form of retroactive classification when it
seals court records and transcripts containing information that has already
been disclosed in open proceedings. Certain types of sealing actions are
specifically permitted by statute. Many states, for instance, have allowed
people to petition for the removal of their Social Security numbers and
bank account information from court records, 0 8 or for the sealing and
expungement of old criminal court records." 9
Outside of these specific statutory provisions, however, courts have been
reluctant to retroactively seal information presented in open court,
especially once that information has been widely disseminated.3 10 The
Second Circuit made this point in a case where a judge's published order
improperly revealed confidential settlement information: "[H]owever
confidential it may have been beforehand, subsequent to publication it was
confidential no longer. . . . We simply do not have the power, even were we

of the mind to use it if we had, to make what has thus become public private
again." 311 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit overturned a judicial gag order
prohibiting two reporters from publishing grand jury information that a
trial judge had inadvertently disclosed in open court. 312 These cases are in
line with the Supreme Court's decisions in Nebraska Press and Oklahoma
Publishing, both of which held that information, once disclosed in court,
3 13
cannot be suppressed.
Nonetheless, some courts do allow retroactive sealing of records, even
outside the statutory provisions. Retroactive sealing has been used to redact
important information blurted out during testimony or otherwise
incautiously revealed. A Delaware court, for example, retroactively sealed
portions of a transcript when a witness testified about the valuation of a
family-owned company-a valuation that had been subject to a
308 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119.0714 (West 2014); MO. S. CT. OPERATING R. 2.05 (West
2014); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 552.147 (West 2013).
309 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-72308 (2014); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9122
(2014); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 263o/5.2 (2014).

310 See Nat'l Polymer Prod., Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 641 F.2d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 1981)
("[W]e begin with the well-established principle of American jurisprudence that the release of
information in open trial is a publication of that information and, if no effort is made to limit its
disclosure, operates as a waiver of any rights a party had to restrict its further use."); see also, e.g.,
Littlejohn v. Bic Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 68o (3 d Cir. 1988); Level 3 Commc'ns, LLC v. Limelight
Networks, Inc., 611F. Supp. 2d 572, 588 (E.D. Va. 2009); Flohrs v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 12-2439,
2013 WL 4773515, at "2 (D. Kan. 2013).
311 Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F. 3 d 133, 144 (2d Cir. 2004).
312 See In re Charlotte Observer, 921 F.2d 47, 48-50 ( 4 th Cir. 199o).

313See supra notes 209-215 and accompanying text.
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confidentiality order. 314 In ordering the retroactive sealing, the court noted
the "almost metaphysical aura" of the debate "about whether once something
is said in open court it becomes part of the public domain."31 Also figuring
into the judge's decision was the fact that everyone present in the courtroom
had been a party to the action and was thus already bound by the
confidentiality order in the case. 316 If a member of the public had been
present, the judge explained, "that might have been the end of the
31
debate."
Another example occurred in a Pennsylvania federal court when a
prosecutor filed with the court-and simultaneously posted on his office's
website-a sentencing memorandum that revealed confidential grand jury
material. 318 The district court sealed the filing, ordered the document
removed from the prosecutor's website, and instructed the prosecutor "to
make all reasonable efforts to retrieve copies of the document that had been
disseminated." 319 Notably, this retroactive sealing occurred despite the fact
320
that news organizations had already received and published the documents.
Retroactive sealing of court records is significant to retroactive
classification because it forces courts to think about the definition of the
public record. Is a single disclosure of a document, perhaps to only one
person, enough to make the information public? The Florida Star Court
would say yes. 321 Retroactive classification would say no. Indeed, retroactive
classification's "reasonably recovered" standard is premised on the
assumption that a document is not really public until it is widely
disseminated. 322 The fact that Social Security numbers and criminal
convictions can be removed from court files that have been open to the
public for decades suggests the courts believe in a retroactive classification
314 See In reTrust for Gore, No. 1165, 2010 WL 5644675, at *3(Del. Ch. Jan. 6, 2011).
315 Id.at*3.
316 Id.
317 Id.Other cases have also allowed retroactive sealing. See TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc. v.
Avago Techs. Ltd., No. 09-1531, 2012 WL 1432519 at *3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 25, 2012); Richardson v.
Mylan Inc., No. 09-1041, 2011 WL 837148 at *2-3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2011). But seeEugene Volokh,
Lawyer Seeking Order that "Will Compel ... Volokh to Remove His ... Blog [Post]", VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Jan. 17, 2o11, 9:51 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2oll/ol/i7/lawyer-seeking-order-thatwill-compel-volokh-to-remove-his-blog-post, archived at http://perma.cc/64VC-3SLK (criticizing a
motion to retroactively seal a court filing and stating that, "under the logic of FloridaStar v. B.J.F,
once a document is made part of the public record, it can't then be withdrawn from the public
record and sealed away in a manner that prevents public comment").
318 United States v. Smith, 123 F.3 d i4o, 145 ( 3 d Cir. 1997).

319 Id.at 145.
320 Id.at 144-46.
321 See supra notes 216-225.

322 See supra subsection I.C. 3.
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of sorts, at least when it comes to their own records. If the courts believed
that information, once disclosed in court, becomes irretrievably part of the
public record, they would not allow these retroactive redactions and
expungements.
But the courts' position is not entirely clear. As noted above, courts
generally recoil from some forms of retroactive sealing, such as, for example,
blotting out testimony that reveals trade secrets. 323 The important thing to
note, however, is that, under the right circumstances, courts are willing to
make a secret out of information that has already been released to the
public. All in all, then, the cases involving the retroactive sealing of court
324
records tend to support retroactive classification.
F. Freedom ofInformation Act
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) case law also challenges the idea
that a document released to the public necessarily remains public. Under
FOIA, agencies may invoke one of nine statutory exemptions to avoid
releasing a document.3 25 However, the question that often arises in these
cases is whether an agency can invoke these exemptions if it has previously
released the document to the public. In other words, does the agency's
release of a document waive the agency's ability to withhold the document
later on? This question touches on the issue at the heart of retroactive
classification: can information previously disclosed by the government be
treated as secret? Perhaps not surprisingly, the circuits have taken different
3 26
approaches to this difficult question.
The leading case in the D.C. Circuit, Cottone v. Reno, involved a
defendant's FOIA request for wiretap recordings that were played at his
criminal trial.3 27 Under federal law, wiretap recordings are statutorily
protected from disclosure,3 28 which allowed the Justice Department to
323 See supra note 310.
324 An important distinction is that retroactive sealing of court records does not affect the
legality of republishing the information that one comes across; it affects only the availability of
that information in the public record. Retroactive classification, on the other hand, bars anyone
with possession of the document from disseminating it further.
325 5 U.S.C. § 55 2(b)()-( 9 ) (2012).

326 See Sydney Hutchins, Comment, The Plaintiff's Last Chance: FOL4's Waiver Doctrine 3-4
(Seton Hall Law eRepository, Paper 126, 2o13), available at http://erepository.law.shu.edu/
studentscholarship/126.
327 193 F.3 d 550, 552-54 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

328 Id. at 553 (citing Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1994 & Supp. IV

1998))). The Justice Department also invoked an exemption that protects personal privacy, but the
D.C. Circuit remanded that question to the trial court. Id. at 556.
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invoke the FOIA exemption for material "specifically exempted from
disclosure by statute."3 29 But the D.C. Circuit held that the exemption could
not be used in this case, noting that "materials normally immunized from
disclosure under FOIA lose their protective cloak once disclosed and
preserved in a permanent public record."330 At first, this opinion appears to
be at odds with retroactive classification because it affirms the idea that
disclosed information can no longer be protected. But the opinion supports
retroactive classification in acknowledging, later on, that documents in the
public record can be "destroyed, placed under seal, or otherwise removed
from the public domain," at which point they can be withheld under
FOIA.3 3 1 In other words, the public domain can be shrunken, which is the
core claim of retroactive classification.
The Second Circuit has dealt with the public-domain doctrine
somewhat differently. It stated that an agency cannot invoke a FOIA
exemption "if identical information is truly public" because, in such a case,
the "exemption cannot fulfill its purposes." 33 2 But "truly public," for the
Second Circuit, was not simply a function of whether the information was
preserved in a "permanent public record." Rather, it was a measure of how
readily accessible or "freely available" the record was. 33 3 The Second Circuit
would thus allow an agency to invoke an exemption even if the agency had
already disclosed the information to the public and even if the information
was permanently in the public domain, so long as that information was not
easily accessible. Interestingly, this ease-of-accessibility formulation parallels
the "reasonably recovered" standard of retroactive classification in that the
more widely disseminated the information, the less the government may do
to control it.
The most extreme position on this issue was taken by the Tenth Circuit
in Prison Legal News v. Executive Office for US. Attorneys. 33 4 This case
involved a FOIA request for photos and video documenting the murder of a
federal prisoner.335 The photos and the video were shown at the trials of the
two inmates accused of murdering him. 336 The prisoners' rights newsletter

329 5 U.S.C. § 55 2(b)(3) (2012); Cottone, 193 F.3 d at 552-53.
330 Cottone, 193 F.3d at 554.
331 Id. at 556.
332 Inner City Press/Cmty. on the Move v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 463 F.3 d

244 (2d Cir. 2oo6) (quoting Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 169 F.3 d
16, 19 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
333 Id. at 243-44, 252.
334 628 F.3 d 1243 (loth Cir. 2011).
335 Id.at 1246.
336 Id.
239,
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that requested the materials said that the materials' public showing at the
337
two trials meant that they could not be withheld under FOIA.
Nonetheless, the government invoked the exemption that protects against
invasions of privacy, asserting that the privacy of the victim's family would
be harmed by the materials' release. 338 The Tenth Circuit sided with the
government, holding that because the photos and video had been shown
only to a small audience (those present at the two trials), they were not
made public. 339 The court noted that "the limited nature of the prior public
disclosure" meant there was still a protectable privacy interest and, as a
340
result, the photos were not in the public record.
This approach to the public record, and to public court records in
particular, further undermines the idea that the public record remains
inviolable. 341 In this way, the Tenth Circuit's approach embraces retroactive
classification's claim that information the government has placed in the
public record can still be treated as secret. These public-domain cases
confirm the most basic and controversial premise behind retroactive
3 42
classification: the public record is not a land-of-no-return.

Where do all these analogies to retroactive classification leave us? The
answer is with much less confidence in the First Amendment's power to
fight off a prosecution based on retroactively classified documents. Such a
prosecution may have seemed ridiculous in light of Florida Star's disclosure
principle, but the issue is not so simple. If the retroactive classification of
Social Security numbers, police officers' home addresses, and court records
causes courts to question the protections afforded by the First Amendment,
then courts would surely question these protections even more in the
context of retroactive classification, where national security interests are at
stake. From Social Security number protections to FOIA requests, these

337 Id.

338 Id. at 1253.
339

Id. at

1249-5o.

340 Id. The Tenth Circuit noted that the petitioners had brought only a FOIA claim, not any

right-to-court-documents claim. Id. at 1253.
341 See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 891 (2012) (rejecting the claim that the First
Amendment "renders the public domain largely untouchable by Congress," in a case challenging
Congress's award of copyright protection to certain works in the public domain).
342 As with retroactively sealed court records, FOIA case law is distinguishable from
retroactive classification because the former limits only access to the information, while the latter
also limits the use of the information by members of the public. See supra note 324.
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cases show that the prospect of a successful prosecution based on
retroactively classified documents is far more plausible than it first appears.
But it is not just that these cases make retroactive classification a more
plausible threat. They also show that the constitutional issues raised by
retroactive classification have broad application beyond the realm of
national security. Contrary to scholarly assumptions, the fact that
information is contained in the public record does not mean it can be
published with impunity. Over the years, as the number of documents in
the public record and the ability to publish these documents have both
rapidly increased, the courts have been quietly renegotiating the limits on
the government's power to control public-record-based speech. Retroactive
classification, one of the most extreme examples of this power, illustrates
the lengths to which the government may go in its attempt to keep
information secret. It shows that the government can attempt the
impossible. It can reach back in time to make secret a document that it has
already disclosed to the world.
IV. SEPARATION OF POWERS

Beyond its implications for speech and press freedoms, retroactive
classification also challenges the separation of powers. This Part explores the
separation of powers implications of retroactive classification and unpacks
the paradox that members of Congress are both more protected from and
more vulnerable to retroactive classification than other members of society.
The separation of powers analysis begins with the fact that the executive
branch has used retroactive classification to stymie congressional oversight.
As noted above, the Pentagon retroactively classified testimony about the
missile defense system even though the testimony had been given in an
43
open session of Congress and published in the Congressional Record.1
"[T]he principal effect of the Department's actions," wrote Representatives
Henry Waxman and John Tierney, "will be to prevent members of Congress
from being able to issue thorough and thoughtful critiques of
Administration actions in a public forum."344 Retroactive classification also
prevented the GAO from including key material in its public report about
the missile defense system, thus tampering with the integrity of the GAO's
3 45

analysis.

343 See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.

344 Letter from Henry A. Waxman & John F. Tierney, Sens., to Donald Rumsfeld, supra note
3, at 4.
34 5
Id.
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Other cases, too, have raised concerns that retroactive classification was
preventing members of Congress from doing their jobs. Senator Chuck
Grassley said the retroactive classification he experienced in the Sibel
Edmonds affair was "as close to a gag order as you get."3 46 In another case,

Representative Chris Van Hollen worried about retroactive classification's
effect on Congress's ability to stay informed. "I think it is amazing," he said,
"that an individual working for the government could be criminally liable
for providing to a Member of Congress in an unclassified setting a
document that had been published by the U.S. Government. 3 47 In 2007,
retroactive classification so upset members of the House that they
overwhelmingly voted for a resolution condemning the practice. 148
Yet, despite their scorn for retroactive classification, it is clear that
members of Congress go along with it. What is not clear is why. After all,
the Constitution's Speech or Debate Clause protects them from prosecution
for anything they say in the course of their legislative duties.3 49 If legislators
thought retroactive classification was inappropriate in a particular case, they
could just read the classified information into the public record without fear
of prosecution. Senator Mike Gravel demonstrated this power with aplomb.
On the eve of the Pentagon Papers decision, while the New York Times and
Washington Post were still enjoined from publishing the top secret
documents, Gravel held a late-night meeting of the Senate Subcommittee
on Buildings and Grounds and began reading the top secret documents
aloud. 350 Gravel ran out of steam at i:a5 AM, at which point he entered the
remaining documents into the record, making the documents public for all
the world to see.35s Gravel was not punished. As the Supreme Court held in
a case resulting from the incident, the Speech or Debate Clause prevented
Gravel from being questioned, much less prosecuted. 35 2 Thus, the
Constitution would appear to empower other members of Congress to
disobey retroactive classification.
But members of Congress have not defied retroactive classification, and
this may be because the legislative branch's own rules prevent its members

346 Lichtblau, supra note 31.
347

Drowning in a Sea of Faux Secrets Hearing,supra note 4,at 16o.

348 See 153CONG. REC. H1,577 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2007).

349 U.S. CONST. art. I, §6, cl.
1;see also Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 6o6, 615-16 (1972).
350 Gravel, 4o8 U.S. at 6o9.

351 Id.; Sen. Gravel Reads Documents, Ends Report on War in Tears, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 1971, at
Al. If the Supreme Court had approved the prior restraint on the Pentagon Papers, Gravel's
actions would have raised the fascinating question of whether someone could be punished for
publishing classified information in the CongressionalRecord.
352 Gravel, 408 U.S. at 616.
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from releasing classified information. For instance, House Rule XXIII
requires members to swear an oath of confidentiality before accessing
classified information. 3 3 The internal rules also set out procedures by which
members of Congress can go about disclosing classified information. Under
House Rule X(u1)(g), for example, the Select Committee on Intelligence
can disclose "any information in its possession" if it determines that
disclosure is in "the public interest."3 4 Before that disclosure can happen,
however, the Committee must vote to disclose the information and then
give the president five days to object. 355 If the president objects and if the
Committee still wants to disclose the information, the Committee must seek a
vote of the full House or Senate. 35 6 Any member of Congress who discloses
classified information without following this procedure is subject to "censure,
removal from committee membership, or expulsion." 357 In 1975,
Representative Michael Harrington of Massachusetts transgressed the House
classification rules and found himself not only subject to an Ethics
Committee investigation but also barred from further access to classified
358
information.
Because of these internal rules, a retroactive classification order binds
the legislative branch even though legislators are immune from prosecution.
In fact, members of Congress are arguably more constrained by retroactive
classification than those outside government because they can clearly be
punished for violating the congressional rules. Journalists and members of
the public, by contrast, can be punished only if the statutory and
constitutional challenges to an Espionage Act prosecution can be overcome,
which we have seen is a question open to debate. Because of Congress's
internal rules, retroactive classification allows the executive branch to
muzzle congressional debate on an issue even when the executive branch is
unable to quiet the press. By gagging Congress and interfering with
353 JOHN V. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON'S MANUAL, AND RULES OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. DOC. NO. 111-157, at 931 (2d Sess. 2o1) ("Before a

Member... of the House may have access to classified information, the following oath (or
affirmation) shall be executed: I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will not disclose any
classified information received in the course of my service with the House of Representatives,
except as authorized by the House of Representatives or in accordance with its Rules."').
354 Id. at 532. The Senate has a similar provision. See MATTHEW McGOWAN, STANDING
RULES, ORDERS, LAWS, AND RESOLUTIONS AFFECTING THE BUSINESS OF THE UNITED
STATES SENATE, § 81(8), S. DOC. NO. 112-1, at 150-53 (ist Sess. 2011).
355 H.R. DOC. No. 111-157, at 532-33.
356 Id. at 533-36.
35 7

Id. at 536.

358 HarringtonBarredfrom Secret Data by Panel in House, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1975, at A17; see
also James J. Kilpatrick, Should the House Expel a Member? Secrecy: A Matter of Honor, L.A. TIMES,
June 30, 1975, at B 5 .
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congressional oversight, retroactive classification is an affront to the
separation of powers.
V. CONCLUDING NOTE AND SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
This Article has demonstrated retroactive classification's grave
implications for the freedom of speech, the freedom of the press, and the
separation of powers. The Article has shown retroactive classification's
strange and unsettling ability to make secrets out of information in the
public domain. It has also argued that retroactive classification could be
enforced by an Espionage Act prosecution. Though such a prosecution
might founder on the rocks of the First Amendment, there are reasons to
think that it would not. The retroactive classification of sorts taking place in
other areas of the law provides reason to believe that, in the context of
national security, the courts would allow retroactive classification to be
enforced by criminal prosecution. And the possibility of this prosecution is
enough to cause someone in possession of retroactively classified documents
to return them or, at least, to refrain from publishing them-in short, it is
enough to chill speech. Retroactive classification is thus a First Amendment
problem. And, as we have seen, it is a separation-of-powers problem when
applied to members of Congress.
But retroactive classification also has troubling implications for the
integrity of the public record and for the public's ability to make use of that
record. What do we do when the government makes a mistake in releasing
what should be confidential information, whether its own, another
country's, or an individual citizen's? Do we allow it to tear that information
out of the public record? Does that answer change if the information still
remains available on the Internet, in libraries, or elsewhere in the public
domain? Retroactive classification gives a green light to the government's
power to control the public domain. This little-known and unconstrained
power attacks our basic assumptions about the public record. As the
government amasses more and more secrets, and as it gets easier and easier
to release them en masse, we will increasingly be faced with the question of
how far the government may go to recover this information. The answer, as
this Article has shown, will have profound consequences that reach into our
everyday lives.
While there are no easy answers to the big questions retroactive
classification raises about the government's control of information in the
public domain, there are a few reforms that could be employed to address
the immediate problems posed by retroactive classification. For example, the
president could amend the executive order to include an outright ban on
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classifying any document that the government has disclosed to the public.
This simple change would wipe out all three types of retroactive
classification. It would avoid the metaphysical and constitutional concerns
of making a secret out of something in the public domain, while also
sending the message that the public may freely make use of the public
record without interference from the government-a message that would
echo into many other substantive areas of the law.
Far better than an executive order, however, would be for a statute to
institute the same reforms. The ban on classifying information disclosed to
the public could even include a carve-out for instances of retroactive
35 9
classification authorized by Congress, such as in the Atomic Energy Act.

With or without such carve-outs, congressional intervention is ideal
because, no matter how airtight the executive order is in outlawing
retroactive classification, the order is only as protective as the whims of the
next president. Congressional committees have for years recommended a
statutory intervention to reform the classification system, and the Supreme
Court has indicated that such an intervention would be constitutional. 360 To
the extent retroactive classification offends members of Congress, they have
only themselves to blame for not addressing the problem.
But even if Congress cannot get the president's signature on a statutory
fix, it could, at the very least, eliminate the separation-of-powers problems
by amending the House and Senate rules on the disclosure of classified
information. The amended House and Senate rules should simply state that
members of Congress are not bound to respect the confidentiality of any
classified information that the government has previously disclosed. 36' That
would free legislators to disobey retroactive classification without fear of
violating the internal rules, thus removing the executive's ability to gag the
public deliberations of the House and Senate.

359 Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (2012)); see United

States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 994 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (discussing the restrictions
imposed by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954).
360 See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 83 (1973).
361 See supra notes 353-357 and accompanying text.
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